





Dialogue dynamics, programming challenges:

Donor approaches to anti-corruption and integrity reform in Cambodia, 2004 to 2009

Background paper for the U4 training workshop "Integrity reform in Cambodia: Taking stock towards shared priorities for donor-government dialogue", 26th and 27th January 2010, Phnom Penh

> by Sokbunthoeun So, Sedara Kim and Aled Williams with Vandoeun Chhiv

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by

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1. Introduction

Through the 1980's and 1990's, Cambodia underwent a transformation that eventually led to peace after many years of war, the re-establishment of a market-based economy, and the initiation of democratic reforms, beginning with the United Nations' sponsored election in 1993 (Öjendal and Lilja: 2009). Since this period, Cambodia is observed to have become increasingly stable politically, while, economically, the country has achieved sustained growth. GDP growth has averaged almost 10% annually during the five years just before the current global economic crisis. ² Good economic performance has been accompanied by a falling poverty rate and improvements in human development indicators. The percentage of people living under the national poverty line dropped from 47% in 1994 to 35% in 2004 (World Bank: 2006). The Human Development Index (HDI) increased from 0.511 in 2000 to 0.598 in 2007/2008, with Cambodia ranking 131 from 177 countries.³

Cambodia continues to face significant development challenges, however. Welfare gains from economic growth have occurred on a relatively narrow basis and appear to have largely benefited urban populations. The poverty rate in Phnom Penh can now be as low as 5%, compared to 25% in semi-urban areas on the fringes of the city and the rural average of around 39%. Regional variations in poverty are also to be observed, with the plateau/mountain region experiencing the highest rate at 52%, and Siem Reap reaching 42.8% despite its tourist economy (Ministry of Planning and UNDP: 2007).

Poor governance and corruption are widely acknowledged as major impediments to alleviating poverty and achieving development objectives in Cambodia. A 2004 World Bank report indicates that poor governance has taken a heavy toll on the Cambodian poor and presents a major obstacle to development by limiting access to public goods, contributing to the mishandling of natural resource wealth, and creating an unfavourable business environment (World Bank, 2004).⁴ In response to the challenging nature of Cambodia's governance environment, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have, for some years, devoted a significant part of their assistance to the promotion of good governance and public integrity in the country. Some specific donor supported programmes that attempt to mitigate the impact of corruption on development outcomes have also been implemented.⁵

² See also: Asian Economic Outlook Database <u>sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp</u> (accessed 20 July 2009); and: Asian Development Outlook 2009: Rebalancing Asia's Growth <u>www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2009/</u> (accessed 21 July 2009).

³ See: Human Development Report, <u>hdr.undp.org/en/</u>

⁴ See also: Kato et al (2000).

⁵ For example, see: "Dissemination of Cambodia Fiduciary Review and Adoption of Standard Operating Procedure," remarks made by Ian Porter, World Bank Country Director for Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 13 December 2005; and: The United Nations (UN), *United Nations Development Assistance Framework (for Cambodia) 2006-2010*, Phnom Penh, February 2005.

This study aims to provide an overview of donor approaches to reforms related to anticorruption and integrity in Cambodia over the past five years, from 2004 to 2009. It investigates the manner in which donor agencies have conceived of Cambodia's governance and corruption challenges, the manner in which they have conducted dialogue on these challenges with government counterparts, and the programmatic means they have adopted to attempt to meet the identified challenges. It also attempts to capture some tentative lessons for future donor dialogue and programming in relation to anti-corruption and integrity reform in the country.

1.1 Method and structure of report

The study's findings are based on (a) a desk review of published material - including donor and government reports and policy documents, and research literature - pertaining to donor approaches to anti-corruption and integrity reform and, (b), semi-structured interviews with donor agency country office staff with responsibilities for governance programming. An overview of relevant donor activities for the period under study is provided in Annex 1. Annex 2 provides an overview of relevant publications, both from donor agencies themselves and from other sources. A list of those donor representatives who were interviewed for the study is given in Annex 3, while Annex 4 provides a summary of official development assistance for governance and administration-linked projects and programmes.

2. Analysis of donor anti-corruption and integrity related interventions

2.1 How donors conceptualise corruption

Corruption in Cambodia ranges from the small scale extraction of rents or informal fees at points of contact between the public and civil servants to grand corruption. This latter form of corruption may involve the sale of public resources, the adoption of policy reforms that may offer undue benefits to key allies, or the buying of political influence through, for instance, offering allies and/or relatives highly favourable government licenses in exchange for material and political gain. Both forms of corruption may be interrelated and, indeed, mutually reinforcing (Calavan et al: 2004).

There appears to be no significant variation in the definitions of corruption used by donor agencies present in the country. Although slightly different terminologies are sometimes used, corruption is commonly defined as the abuse of public authority for private gain.⁶ A

⁶ This is consistent with the definitions of corruption advanced by the World Bank and Transparency International (TI). The World Bank's working definition of corruption is "abuse of public power for private benefit". TI takes a broader approach: "the misuse of entrusted power for private gain".

distinction is commonly made by donors between small and large scale corruption in the country, though there are nuances in the terminology used. Small and large scale corruption is often referred to as administrative and grand corruption respectively (USAID: 2005). At times, large scale corruption is further divided into "grand corruption" and "political corruption". Reference is therefore made to three distinct levels of corruption in ascending order: petty corruption, grand corruption, and political corruption.

2.2 How donors have engaged in anti-corruption and integrity programming

Major international donors operate in Cambodia within the framework of their country assistance strategies or plans, delivering assistance to sectors deemed significant for achieving agreed development and poverty reduction goals.⁷ The strategies commonly emphasise promoting development through improving rural livelihoods, improving delivery in the health and education sectors, spurring private sector growth, improving quality of governance, and addressing corruption.

Donor agency officials are cognisant of the harm corruption can incur in relation to development and poverty reduction goals in Cambodia. This awareness has prompted implementation of intensified risk management strategies for aid delivery in an attempt to ensure assistance is used to benefit the Cambodian population in an optimal manner. Donor funded projects or programmes implemented across the sector areas noted above are monitored (particularly with regard to procurement standards), and are audited and evaluated in an attempt to ensure standards of efficiency and transparency. Specific sanctions for irregularities in aid provision have, on occasion, been brought. The discovery, for example, of irregularities in World Bank funded projects in June 2006 led to the temporary withdrawal of USD 7.6 million from three projects (namely the Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP), the Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project, and the Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project). The further disbursement of funds was suspended for part of these three projects, with the suspension subsequently removed in February 2007 following agreements between the World Bank and the Cambodian government on actions needed to improve efficiency and transparency in the projects' implementation.⁸

Agreements between donors and the Cambodian government have also been made with regard to the enactment of an anti-corruption law and the enactment of a law on freedom of

⁷ For example, see: Asian Development Bank, *Country Strategy and Program Midterm Review: Cambodia* 2005-2009, Phnom Penh, ADB, 2007; and Thornton P. et al, *Evaluation of* Department for International Development (DFID) *Country Programmes: Cambodia*, Phnom Penh, DFID, 2009.

⁸ See: "Cambodia: World Bank Release Latest Statement and Update," *World Bank Press Release*, 22 June 2006; and "World Bank Lifts Suspension of project," *World Bank Press Release*, 7 February 2007.

information. A drafting process for an anti-corruption law began in 1994 with donor support. Following a pause of several years, this process began again in 2006. As of January 2010, however, the enactment of laws on anti-corruption and on freedom of information is still pending, although a new text for the anti-corruption law may be made public during 2010. It should be noted that Cambodia became a party of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in September 2007, adding a further multilateral dimension to donor engagement on issues of good governance and corruption in the country.⁹

In terms of programming activities, donor agencies have provided support to reform programmes aimed at addressing institutional governance weaknesses and corruption. The delicacy of concerns surrounding corruption has led to a preference for mainstreamed donor engagement strategies. Much of the donors' anti-corruption related work is considered by donor staff to be nested within activities implemented across a range of programmatic areas. Reform programmes relating to private sector development, for instance, refer to reducing bureaucratic red tape in the process of starting a business, which may, in part, relate to corruption. Sensitivities surrounding corruption are also reflected in the terminology used by donor agency staff to refer to interventions that may be considered to have a bearing on corruption: "good governance reform" is preferred over "anti-corruption reform" as a general term – with an additional emphasis placed on the positive values of "integrity" and "transparency", particularly in relation to the public service.

Perhaps in part as a means to distance the donor community from the overtly critical connotations of "anti-corruption work", an intermediary non-governmental organisation (NGO) has served as a main implementing partner for projects and programmes that directly address corruption. Between 2004 and 2008, Pact Cambodia¹⁰ implemented an Anti-Corruption Coordinated Action Program (ACCAP). It has also been the implementing agency for the Anti-Corruption for Equity (MAE) programme since 2006. Its work has entailed assisting the Ministry of National Assembly-Senate Relations (MoNASRI) in drafting an anti-corruption law, public awareness raising activities - such as the "Clean Hands" campaign - promoting the adoption of an international standard anti-corruption law through its "Million Signatures" campaign, and facilitating anti-corruption initiatives at grassroots level by administering small grants to community-based organisations.

Various projects and programmes with a focus on good governance reforms have been implemented collaboratively among a group of donors. These can generally be categorised into those addressing the so-called "supply side" and those addressing the "demand side" of

⁹ www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories

¹⁰ www.pactcambodia.org/

good governance. The former generally encompasses programmes aimed at upgrading the government's technical and management capacities, including those that address public financial management, public administration reform, and legal and judicial reform. The latter involves projects and programmes that are designed to nurture the role of social stakeholders in holding public officials accountable for policy decisions. The following section addresses each of these reform areas in more detail.

2.2.1 Public financial management (PFM)

PFM reforms aim to rationalise the management of public finances by strengthening the government's ability to collect and manage revenues from tax and non-tax based sources, and to formulate and execute the budget. Donor support to PFM reforms in Cambodia has specifically sought to develop the capacity of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and to upgrade the capacity of the National Audit Authority (NAA) to provide regulatory oversight for the financial sector. A Merit Based Pay Initiative (MBPI) was introduced for selected MEF staff in 2005, with merit based selection and promotion of staff subsequently introduced as a part of the MEF's personnel management strategy.¹¹

The application of merit-based pay in the MEF has resulted in the spill-over introduction of similar personnel management schemes in other government ministries, including the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Ministry of Commerce (MoC), the Ministry of Youth, Education, and Sport (MYES), and the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction (MLMUPC).¹² Donors including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the European Community (EC), the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA), and the World Bank have provided support to these PFM initiatives. It should be noted, however, that some concern has been expressed by donor representatives about the continuation of MBPI given recent government signals in this regard.

¹¹ See: "Development Partner's Consensus Statement on Governance for the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (June 19-29, 2007) Discussion Statement,"

www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/first_cdcf/session1/sonsensus_statement.htm (Accessed 25 December 2009); and "Financing Agreement (Public Financial Management and Accountability Project) between the Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association," Phnom Penh: Royal Cambodian Government and International Development Association, 13 February 2007.

¹² See: "Cambodia: Public Financial Management Reform Program Annual Review 2008," Remarks by Mr. John Nelmes, IMF Resident Representative in Cambodia on behalf of Development Partners, Phnom Penh, 28 May 2008.

2.2.2 Public administration reform (PAR)

One of the main challenges identified by donor agencies as an obstacle to providing efficient public services is the payment of unreasonably low wages to public officials.¹³ The poor public remuneration system appears to discourage particularly qualified individuals from seeking employment in the civil service. Simultaneously, however, the additional opportunities for petty corruption presented by civil service positions means that such employment is still apparently prized and sought after by many Cambodians, despite meagre official remuneration.

PAR initiatives in the country have primarily aimed to improve the efficiency of public service delivery by introducing competitive pay for civil servants and a merit based system for hiring and promoting public officials. Donors have sought to support government access to sufficient resources to introduce such changes, with a direct link made between PFM and PAR initiatives. A number of donors, including the ADB, EC and the German technical cooperation agency, GTZ, have actively supported PAR.

Part of Cambodia's PAR relates to Decentralisation and Deconcentration (D&D) programmes. These programmes seek to support capacity building for elected communal councils, to improve delivery of public services, to develop local infrastructure, promote civic engagement in local governance, and enhance the accountability of elected communal councillors toward voters. The Local Administration and Reform (LAAR) programme supported by USAID and implemented by Pact Cambodia, for instance, has involved training of commune councillors, civil society organisations and citizens in good governance practices.¹⁴ Further multilateral and bilateral donors, including the ADB, the Danish Ministry of Development (Danida), DFID, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinBuza), the EC, GTZ, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), SIDA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank, have also supported various D&D programmes.

2.2.3 Legal and judicial reform

Many donor programmes with a focus on good governance began with support for the creation of appropriate legal regulations. Police and judges are referred to in the literature as

¹³ For example, see: Development Partner's Consensus Statement on Governance for the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum, June 19-29, 2007; see also: Economic Institute of Cambodia, Assessment of Corruption in Cambodia's Private Sector, Phnom Penh: EIC, 2006.

¹⁴ See: <u>www.pactworld.org/cs/local_administration_and_reform_program_laar</u>

among the most corrupt public institutions in the country.¹⁵ Recognition among donors that weaknesses within the judicial system - and among the institutions that support the judiciary - would undermine other good governance reform efforts has ensured that legal and judicial reform has been a key priority.

The legal and judicial reform process has encompassed a wide range of issues, with the goal of building the overall capacity of judicial institutions to efficiently, neutrally, and professionally implement and enforce legal regulations. These reforms have entailed (i) upgrading technical expertise among judges, prosecutors and clerical staff; (ii) improving remuneration for members of the judiciary; and (iii) establishing rules and regulations with regard to the employment of judges. Another element of legal and judicial reforms is the enactment of key enabling laws, including the anti-corruption law referred to above (LICADHO: 2006). A Technical Working Group (TWG) has been formed to assist the government with regard to legal and judicial reform, while an informal working group – considered a sub-group of the TWG - has also been established to provide a venue for information-sharing among donors and to coordinate donor positions on the anti-corruption law.

2.2.4 Demand for good governance

Demand for good governance (DFGG) projects aim to promote the role of civil society (including citizens, civil society organisations, and other non-state entities) in ensuring greater accountability from state actors and in encouraging responsiveness of the state towards the needs of citizens. The World Bank is one of the main supporters of DFGG, and its project centres on four key elements:

- First, demand is promoted through increasing non-state actors' access to information on, for example, government budgets, expenditure and programmes. The basic focus is on access to information and awareness-raising campaigns, citizen education with regard to rights, and media programmes for awareness promotion.
- Second, once sufficient demand is perceived to have been generated, means for mobilizing collective action are sought, with this action often mediated through institutionalised state mechanisms. In this respect, the project mediates demand by strengthening avenues for citizen and civil society feedback to state officials, via, for example, the office of the ombudsman.
- Third, DFGG involves programme development on the part of the state to respond to citizen demand. This function corresponds to programmes that address the supply side of good governance.

¹⁵ For a detailed discussion of corruption within the Cambodian court system, see: Un (2006).

Finally, DFGG provides for monitoring to inform demand. This entails oversight of the state by the media, civil society and legislators in the form of independent analysis, formal oversight (e.g. by parliament), media investigations, and participatory approaches involving citizens themselves (World Bank: 2007).

Some projects implemented by Pact Cambodia have also addressed demand for good governance. The "Million Signature" campaign, for instance, petitions for the adoption of an international standard anti-corruption law. Similarly, the training of Khmer journalists on investigative reporting techniques is an attempt to strengthen non-state capacities for monitoring and engaging with public policy issues, potentially including questions of governance and corruption.¹⁶

2.3 The dynamics of donor-government dialogue on anti-corruption and integrity

Cambodia relies heavily on multilateral and bilateral development assistance to fund its annual budget, with about half of annual government expenditures financed by foreign development assistance.¹⁷ This environment has presented avenues for donor agencies to promote various good governance reform programmes on the government's public policy agenda. Facilitated by meetings of the Consultative Group (CG) - currently known as the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) - donor agencies have been in a position to discuss the government's policy agenda and advance certain policy options.¹⁸ The leverage that international donor agencies appear to be able to exercise with regard to good governance, anti-corruption and integrity reform may be mitigated by three factors, however.

First, there is no single strategy among donor agencies for how to address corruption and integrity at country level. Most strategies follow the parameters put forward by a particular donor agency's headquarters, and involve mainstreamed approaches rather than explicit anti-corruption programming. There is, however, a working group on anti-corruption - which serves as a forum for donor discussions, for the sharing of information, and for planning coordinated action. Some donor representatives have suggested, however, that the *de facto* mandate of this group is somewhat limited to informal discussions.

Second, China has recently emerged as a major donor to Cambodia and appears until now not to have prioritised institutional reforms to the same extent as other international donors present in the country. In 2007, China's financial assistance constituted USD 91.5 million of

¹⁶ See: Pact Cambodia's Anti-Corruption Coordinated Action Program

www.pactworld.org/cs/cambodia_anticorruption_coordinated_action_program ¹⁷ This ODA figure varies depending on the Public Investment Programme (PIP). For more details see: www.mop.gov.kh/Home/PIP/tabid/155/Default.aspx

¹⁸ CDCF meetings are supplemented by quarterly Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) meetings, see: www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/

USD 689 million pledged by other donor agencies in the CG (Lum et al: 2008). The amount of aid and loans from China has increased rapidly over the past two years. Between 2007 and 2009, Chinese assistance to Cambodia amounted to USD 236 million compared to USD 337 million from Japan and USD 215 million from EU countries (Lum et al: 2008). In October 2009, the Cambodian Prime Minister secured an additional USD 500 million as a loan for various infrastructure projects.¹⁹

Third, the existence of deposits of oil and gas in Cambodia's territorial waters in the Gulf of Thailand was confirmed in 2006. Significant revenues from these resources are expected when production begins in 2011, with an initial estimate of annual revenue from Block A of USD 174 million, gradually rising to USD 1.7 billion in 2021, before production begins to decline.²⁰ Estimated revenue from both oil and gas in all six blocks ranges between USD 6 and 7.5 billion over the course of 25 years.²¹ This inflow of oil and gas revenues will add another income source to the state budget which may be somewhat removed from external pressure to implement institutional reforms linked to good governance.

2.4 Challenges for donors in approaching anti-corruption and integrity reform

In spite of the anti-corruption and integrity reform initiatives and programmes advanced by many of Cambodia's international donors, and as discussed above, corruption remains endemic in the country. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) consistently scores Cambodia as highly corrupt: it scored 2.3 out of a best possible 10 in 2005, 2.1 in 2006, 2.0 in 2007, 1.8 in 2008 and 2.0 in 2009.²² It has been estimated that between USD 300 and 500 million is lost to corruption each year (Calavan et al: 2004). Corrupt activity has also been linked to donor funded projects, including a 2003 demobilization project and various infrastructure, water sanitation and governance projects in 2006 (Moore: 2006).

The nature of aid dependency allows for the advancement by donor agencies of various good governance and anti-corruption reform initiatives. The domestic political economy, however, presents conditions that are resistant to such reforms. Cambodia displays features of the neo-patrimonial state, whereby modern bureaucracy and the personalised patron-

¹⁹ See: Eang Mengleng and Bethany Lindsay, "Hun Sen Secures 500 M in China Visit," *The Cambodia Daily 19 October 2009.*

²⁰ According to Douglas Gardner, UNDP Resident Representative, this calculation is based on an oil price of USD 60 per barrel and extraction costs of USD 20 per barrel, with some 60% of gross revenues accruing to the government based on a sliding formula in the production sharing agreement with Chevron in Block A only. See: Gardner, "An Historic Opportunity to Achieve Shared Prosperity and Secure Long-Term Stability", speech given at the Cambodia Outlook Conference, January 2007.

²¹ This is based on estimated recoverable oil (2 billion barrels) and gas (10 trillion cubic feet) at a conservative oil price of USD 50 per barrel and a gas price of USD 5 per cubic feet. See: Un and So (2009).

²² www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009

client relationships of traditional authorities are fused (Erdmann and Engel: 2007). Personalized relationships pervade the formal bureaucratic structure and allow for a "politically motivated distribution of favours" that can take place reciprocally or unequally between two persons (a patron and a client), but also between one patron and a larger group (patronage) (Erdmann and Engel: 2007).²³

Since the settlement of difficult negotiations with the opposition around forming a coalition government after the 2003 legislative elections, the CPP has firmly consolidated power (Heder: 2005). This consolidation is attributed in the literature to the party's ability to maintain a strong and complex patronage network that consists of a key segment of the political, military and business elite.²⁴ The close relationships among these elites are cemented by material interests through the allocation of resources. Loyal allies are assigned key government positions or awarded lucrative business licenses (Hughes and Un: forthcoming). Beneficiaries of the bureaucratic appointments and favourable business licenses are then required to contribute back to the party. Because access to the state and state-controlled resources provides avenues for self enrichment and power, bureaucrats and businesspeople alike are obliged to reciprocate and support their leaders. This results in systemic corruption in the Cambodian bureaucracy (Calavan et al: 2004, Heder: 2005).

The above arrangement enriches party leaders and provides financial resources to facilitate the ruling party's political patronage strategy, which extends outside the state apparatus to citizens themselves. This strategy centres on the provision of material incentives in the form of gifts and development aid, including the construction of schools, temples and roads (Un: 2008, Hughes: 2000). These activities are financed by private funds earned through dubious processes and by corruption, yet they attract widespread support from among the Cambodian rural population (Un: 2008).

This political-economic condition is a product of the elites' response to a changing political and economic environment (Hughes and Un: forthcoming). Winning elections provides international legitimacy, which is a precondition for the inflow of development aid and thus for the survival of the Cambodian elite. Yet, the CPP relies on its patronage network to access resources to persuade voters to support them and to win the election (Un: 2008). This reliance on patronage gives the party confidence that it may manage the uncertainties associated with policy-based electoral competition. This creates an intertwining interest between top political leaders and key individuals within the patronage network, rendering

²³ See also Ockey (2004)

²⁴ For detailed discussion of patron-clientelism in Cambodia, see: Gottesman (2004), Heder (1995), and Pak et al (2007)

certain reforms that affect the interests of the network challenging, if not impossible. Similarly, the success of certain reforms appears to be aligned to their dissociation from a negative impact on these neo-patrimonial interests.

The Cambodian government maintains an ambivalent position on the issue of good governance and anti-corruption reform. Various government policy papers address concerns about corruption and poor governance, but there appears to be a lack of substantive commitment to achieving the strategic objectives and commitments set out in such documents, as indicated by the prolonged and incomplete process for enacting an anti-corruption law. The *Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency* noted, for instance, that "[...] corruption is debilitating and inimical to orderly growth" (Royal Government of Cambodia: 2004). The document goes on to emphasise that promoting good governance and reducing corruption is required in order to achieve sustainable and equitable development. In addition, the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010, which was warmly welcomed as "a key sign of Government ownership of the development agenda"²⁵ by donor agencies in the 2006 CG meeting, indicates the government's commitment to significantly reduce corruption by 2010 (Royal Government of Cambodia: 2006).

Specific Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMIs) for addressing corruption were developed and agreed to between the government and donor agencies at the 2004 CG meeting. The JMIs were designed to commit cooperation between donors and the Cambodian government on comprehensive implementation of policy reforms to, among other issues, improve governance. The JMIs allow for continuous monitoring by Technical Working Groups (TWGs)²⁶ of government performance on key issue areas. These areas include fighting corruption, judicial reform, and public administration reform (World Bank: 2004).

Donor agency engagement with government in terms of a good governance and anticorruption reform agenda clearly continues to be exposed to the neo-patrimonial interests outlined above. One study suggests that government policies relating to good governance have more to do with pleasing the donor community than with an actual concern to implement potentially effective measures in the context of a weak governance environment:

²⁵ World Bank, *Cambodia: Government and Donor Agree, Opportunity To Benefit From Deeper Reform Is Now*, Consultative Group Meeting, Phnom Penh, 2-3 March 2006.

²⁶ TWGs were first created in 1999 to facilitate and coordinate policy dialogue between donors and the government. In 2004, these original TWGs were restructured into joint Cambodian government and donor TWGs addressing eighteen issue areas under the management of the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC). These TWGs serve to coordinate and manage international aid as well as to monitor the Cambodian government's development performance. See Cox (2006).

[top officials] readily admit to corruption in ministries and courts during discussions with donors, but never admit personal involvement, and dwell on petty abuses, never on grand scale corruption or on vast personal fortunes that are being built. Despite apparent government "frankness" when speaking English with donors, Cambodian observers note that senior officials do not admit any culpability when speaking in Khmer to the Cambodian people... In an apparent effort to convince donors that activity is more important than commitment, the RGC has participated in preparing innumerable plans and has established numerous councils. The plans reflect state-of-the-art thinking in the international donor community, and are rich in rhetoric on such themes as good governance, transparency, accountability and participation. There is an Anti-Corruption Council, a Council for Judicial and Legal Reform, a Council on Social Development and additional councils on land reform and reform of the military. However, [...] in almost every case, the plans and councils are little more than a studied attempt to tell donors what they want to hear (Calavan et al: 2004).

Though it should be recognised that low governance capacities and wages continue to be immense challenges in Cambodia, corruption in the country by no means merely relates to a lack of technical expertise in specific institutions, or even, in some instances, to a lack of sufficient financial resources. It is also directly related to the political-economic conditions that dictate everyday life. Technical and financial assistance that is not cognisant of these political-economic conditions is likely to result only in "empty" institutions and initiatives that are unable to make a substantive contribution to improving governance standards or, specifically, to the reduction of corruption.

Legal and judicial reforms, for example, are intended to complement efforts to advance the adoption of an anti-corruption law. Low salaries in the judicial system have been cited as at least partly responsible for the persistence of corruption. Indeed, monthly salaries for court officials prior to 2002 averaged USD 14 – an extremely low amount compared to minimum living costs. Since then, as part of legal and judicial reforms, salaries for court officials, including judges and prosecutors, were substantially increased. But corruption in the judicial system remains a major issue and is considered in recent literature to be "systematized and hierarchically controlled" within the wider patronage network (Hughes and Un: forthcoming; Calavan et al: 2004, Nissen, 2005).²⁷ Salary levels, then, if part of the answer, are certainly not the whole solution. Indeed, obstacles to the success of legal and judicial reforms appear to emerge from concern among Cambodian elites that independence of the judiciary could

²⁷ See also, The World Bank, *Cambodia Governance and Corruption Diagnostic: Evidence from Citizen, Enterprise and Public Official Surveys* (Phnom Penh: the World Bank, 10 May 2000), 8.

undermine the personalized patron-client relationships of the neo-patrimonial system. As one study indicates:

Persistent government unwillingness to implement meaningful reform in the judicial sphere represents the conflict between the rule-based governance demanded by the reform proponents and the personalist, hierarchical and discretionary elements of neo-patrimonialism. Lack of judicial strength and independence allows regular interference by the executive branch, and by powerful individuals associated with it, into court affairs. (Hughes and Un: forthcoming).

Donor supported activities that have focused on strengthening internal demand for good governance have constituted a new frontier with regard to good governance reform in Cambodia. Such efforts have occurred in response to empirical evidence indicating that the advancement by donors of "grand design-based" institutional reforms in aid-dependent environments can be counterproductive or will, at the least, fall short of expectations.²⁸

The extent to which the DFGG and other similar projects will help address the endemic corruption present in Cambodia remains to be seen, and will likely depend on more fundamental dynamics in the Cambodian economy, in politics and in society. It should be noted, however, that civil society in Cambodia is referred to in the literature as being weak for three main reasons.

First, many ordinary citizens - particularly those in rural areas who make up around 80% of the population - do not have a culture of confrontation, but prefer to accept the status quo. Though this apparent trait is not exclusive to Cambodia, it has been argued that Cambodians are particularly culturally submissive to higher authority even when such authority appears to be dictatorial and unfair (Mehmet, 1997). One source quotes the following insight in this regard:

One old lady did not receive development aid although she was clearly poor. However, her complaint was that she did not belong to the village chief's "clients," for whom he arranged the distributions. She did not think that the system was corrupt and should be changed, but she felt that she had to belong to this clientele in order to share in the benefits. When asked if what the village chief did was wrong, she focused on the fact that he did not regard her as a "favourite." (Ledgerwood and Vijghen: 2002).

²⁸ See Linda Cornett, *Good Governance and Anti-Corruption in Theory and Practice*, Bank Information Center, 11 April 2007, <u>www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3244.aspx</u> (accessed 13 October 2009).

Second, civil society organisations and NGOs often narrowly prioritise their accountability upwards towards donors. Many NGOs suffer internal management problems, lack mass membership and often operate under the leadership of "founder-directors" in an autocratic style resembling Cambodian state institutions. With little room to advocate change towards a highly politicised public and judicial administration, some NGOs have turned their attention to donor agencies and foreign embassies in an attempt to gain leverage for reforms (Un: 2006).

Third, the literature notes that sections of civil society - such as chambers of commerce - are becoming politicised and may potentially be co-opted into the neo-patrimonial system. As one study notes:

Ideally, a chamber of commerce is an overarching body representing businesses. In Cambodia, chambers of commerce are exclusive clubs consisting of prominent business tycoons. The Chamber of Commerce of Phnom Penh is known as the Oknha Club. The Oknha are directly linked to the ruling party and the government; some are also suspected of engaging in shady businesses.... Chambers of commerce in Cambodia government creations, designed to be a resourceful partner to the state in its goal of maintaining its predominance in Cambodia's hybrid democracy. The elections of the chambers' leaders mirror the national elections in that they involve the use of material inducement and cash to attract votes (Un and So: 2009).

3. Some conclusions

Donor supported reform activities related to good governance, anti-corruption and integrity appear to have yielded limited results in Cambodia over the past five years. Given the challenging nature of the Cambodian political economy, achievements in promoting good governance and stemming corruption in the future will, in part, depend on whether donors can find ways to optimise their limited leverage in specific areas of dialogue and programming, and to engage constructively with reformist, or potentially reformist, constituencies. The following are some tentative thoughts on where a future donor focus might be warranted in this regard.

More frequent direct and informal dialogue between donor and government officials could be introduced within the existing framework of the informal working group on anti-corruption, with a view to enhancing information sharing and mutual understanding of good governance goals. Though many forms of dialogue already exist that have so far yielded limited results, it is evident that dialogue with elite groups in the context of Cambodia's hierarchical neopatrimonial system will continue to be critical. Accountability in such systems occurs upwards between clients and the patron, which implies that reform will require the assumption of some minimum level of ownership and commitment to implementation on the part of the elite. Given the sensitivities surrounding corruption - and the apparent differences between donors and the Cambodian leadership with regard to the issue of patronage - informal, and largely non-confrontational, direct dialogue may help slowly induce a more positive relationship between these leaders and certain policy objectives in keeping with effective good governance reform.

In addition to frequent, non-confrontational dialogue streams, confronting specific obstacles to improved governance and to progress in addressing corruption with government leaders in a direct manner may, in some instances, be useful and appropriate. A case in point may be the current narrowing of political space for the activities of civil society groups and journalists, which appears to pose an obstacle to further progress in relation to demand side governance reforms. Strategies and potential consequences for such direct dialogue interventions may be very carefully mapped out, and weighed for their value in relation to other ongoing streams of dialogue. They may also incorporate learning from past direct dialogue interventions – including those considered both "successful" and "unsuccessful" by donors themselves.²⁹

Good performance in the education and health sectors appears to be aligned with the short and medium term political interests of the Cambodian elite, since this helps alleviate the more immediate consequences of resource distributions associated with the neo-patrimonial system. Continued donor support for strengthening supply side institutions for good governance in relation to these sectors may therefore meet with some successes. An acute awareness on the part of donors is required of the political space in which such reforms are taking place, however, which perhaps again underlines the necessity for more frequent, informal dialogue between donor and government representatives.

D&D programmes appear to be relatively promising in the sense that they aim to allow citizens to participate more actively in decision-making processes at community level. A greater focus could perhaps be placed on gradually strengthening the financial autonomy of commune councils, with taxation activity eventually occurring at close proximity to citizens.

²⁹ A recent example of direct public expression of donor concern about corruption is United States Ambassador Carol A. Rodley's remarks at the "Clean Hands" concert in Phnom Penh, May 2009. See: <u>blog.freedomhouse.org/weblog/2009/07/can-a-concert-kill-cambodian-corruption.html</u>, and <u>cambodia.usembassy.gov/sp_021709.html</u>

Over the longer term, this may assist in decreasing communal leaders' upwards accountability through the neo-patrimonial system. It should be noted that continued great care is required to ensure that D&D reforms do not simply exacerbate corrupt activity at lower levels of government.

Amid the many uncertainties surrounding good governance and anti-corruption reform processes in Cambodia, it is plain that the country's governance and corruption challenges will not be resolved overnight. International donors undertaking continued engagement with the government with regard to these challenges are likely to benefit from enhanced cooperation and harmonisation of their activities. The opportunities for Cambodia's elites to "play-off" one donor against another may be minimised through common strategic planning exercises to determine responses to specific changes in the country's governance environment. This does not necessarily imply a common response from all donors, but perhaps one common strategy from which nuanced responses from individual donors may draw their logic.

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Annex 1: Overview of donor activities

	Donor	Overall strategy	Relevant tools	Name of project/programme	Partner/s
1	ADB	 A focus areas of ADB's Cambodia Country Strategy Paper³⁰ 2005-2009: <i>Intensify Risk Management</i>: There are three main categories of risk in Cambodia – public funds will not be used optimally, weak institutions could lead to a failure to achieve economic diversification, 	 Reference is made to three pillars of action³²: 1. Pillar 1 – Developing effective and transparent systems for public services: <i>Integrity in Public Service, and Accountability and Transparency</i> 	 Public Administration Reform Public Financial Management 	AusAID, CIDA, the EC, UNDP, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Government AusAID, DFID, the EC, France,
		 approach is centred upon three objectives³¹: (i) supporting competitive markets and efficient, effective, accountable, and transparent public 	 Pillar 2 – Strengthening Anti-Bribery Actions and Promoting Integrity in Business Operations: <i>Effective</i> <i>Prevention, Investigation and</i> <i>Prosecution, and Corporate</i> <i>Responsibility and Accountability</i> 	• Fuone Financial Wanagement	IMF, Japan, SIDA, UNDP, the World Bank, and the Government
	administration as pa good governance an (ii) supporting promisin case-by-case basis a dialogue with develo range of governance and (iii) ensuring that ADB p	 administration as part of ADB's broader work on good governance and capacity building; (ii) supporting promising anticorruption efforts on a case-by-case basis and improving the quality of dialogue with developing member countries on a range of governance issues, including corruption; 3. Supporting Active Public Involvement: <i>Public discussion of corruption, Access to information, and Public participation</i> 	Public discussion of corruption, Access to information, and Public participation	• Democratic Governance (D & D) and Human Rights	AusAID, CIDA, SIDA, UNDP, and USAID
				Legal and Judicial Reforms	AFD, CIDA, the EC, Japan, GTZ, and the World Bank, the Netherlands, and the Government
		the highest ethical standards.		• Decentralization and Deconcentration (Building commune office)	DFID, DANIDA, the EC, Japan, GTZ, the Netherlands, SIDA, UNDP, the World Bank, and UNCDF
				Natural Resource Management	

 ³⁰ See ADB, Country Strategy and Programme Midterm Review: Cambodia 2005-2009, the Implications for the Country Strategy, August 2007
 ³¹ See ADB, ANTICORRUPTION: Our Framework Policies and Strategies, II. ADB's Response, page 7
 ³² See ADB, Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: The Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Fighting Corruption in Twenty-one Asian and Pacific Countries, Appendix: Pillars of Actions

2	SIDA	 The strategy focuses mainly on three sectors ³³ that are priorities in Cambodia's poverty reduction strategy – the <i>National Strategic Development Plan</i> (NSDP): 1. democratic governance: A decentralized public administration with greater capacity to satisfy the rights of poor women and men living in rural areas. By working together with other donors towards improved predictability and efficiency in the reform programme for decentralization, public financial management and the area of statistics 2. greater protection for and lawful application of human rights, and 3. support for primary education. Swedish support is in line with Cambodia's National sector objectives covering the fight against corruption, legal reforms, public administration reform. Through the work of supporting NGOs, SIDA is promoting legal advice, observations and documentation of human rights violations, anticorruption and the development of a free press. 	Accountability and Transparency Follow-up system is made up of the joint technical working group between the Cambodian government and the donors.	 Public Financial Management (PFM) Democratic Governance and Human Rights Decentralization and Deconcentration (D & D) Education Institute of Statistics Supporting Policy Research on Democratic Governance (CDRI) Supporting civil society development (Demand for Good Governance DFGG) Natural Resource Management (Climate change) 	AusAID, DFID, the EC, France, IMF, Japan, SIDA, UNDP, the World Bank, and the Government AusAID, CIDA, SIDA, UNDP, and USAID DFID, DANIDA, the EC, Japan, GTZ, the Netherlands, SIDA, UNDP, the World Bank, and UNCDF DC-Cam
				change) • Justice	
3	DFID	The 2005 Country Assistance Plan (CAP) was based on a comprehensive analysis shared with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank and UN that was highly relevant to the context. The CAP included four objectives: 1. Contribute to rapid increase in the impact of	Funding through government systems and pooled mechanisms. Partnership working with other donors was relevant from the perspective of efficiency, partnership expansion, exit strategy, donor harmonization, resource pooling, and	 Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFM 2004-2010) Poverty Reduction and Growth Operation (PRGO) 	World Bank, AusAID, SIDA, the EC, France, Germany, Japan, UNDP and the Ministry of Economy and Finance

³³ See SIDA, Strategy for Development Cooperation with Cambodia: January 2008 – December 2010

	UNDP	 development resources in Cambodia by: i. Supporting government efforts to improve public financial management and accountability; ii. Stronger accountability of government to its citizens; iii. Applying best practice in donor assistance to Cambodia. 2. Responsive, accountable and effective local government for all people, especially the poor and socially excluded. 3. Support government and civil society to strengthen the livelihoods of poor people. 4. Increased access to health services and information 	collective leverage on government to adopt specific reforms.	 Supporting Policy Research on Democratic Governance (CDRI) Poverty Support Programme (2002-2007) Health Sector Land reforms Council of Administration Reform (CAR) National Planning for Poverty Reduction Programme 2008- 2013 Multi-Donor Support to the Council for the Development of Cambodia (2006-2010) Partnership for Local Governance (2002-2006) Project to Support Decentralization and Deconcentration, D & D (2007-2010) Local Government Policy Support Programme 	 World Bank, Japan, the EC, Canada and the Ministry of Economy and Finance World Bank and the Ministry of Planning World Bank and the Ministry of Planning UNDP, NZAid, AusAID, CIDA and the Council for the Development of Cambodia CDRI UNDP, SIDA and the Ministry of Interior SIDA, CDRI and the Ministry of Interior
4		 (UNDAF) 2006-2010 outcome on governance and human rights will be achieving significant progress towards³⁴: Effective participation of citizens in the conduct of public activities and decisions that affect their 	 Launch, development, implementation of national and local anti-corruption strategies; Improving internal accountability; Capacity building of accountability, 	• Integrity in Action Preparatory Assistance Project (2005-2007) was designed in response to the Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia, which identified	 Ministry of National Assembly, Senate Relationship and Inspection (MONASRI) Council of Jurists Ministry of Justice

³⁴ See UNDP, *United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2006-2010*: Good Governance and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2005 ³⁵ See UNDP, *Anti-Corruption Final Version*: Practice Note, February 2004

		 lives; Accountability and integrity of Government in public decision making and policy implementation; and, Effective and responsive state institutions working in a transparent fashion To do champion of change, dialogue with the government, and liaison and capacity building to bring up awareness of corruption. Work closely with National Assembly, Senate, Ministry of Parliament Relations and Inspection, and Ministry of Justice where they are the one who responsible for the anti-corruption law. 	 transparency and integrity (ATI) bodies and national integrity institutions; Providing special focus to strengthening ATI in post-conflict situations; Engaging civil society organizations in ATI programming and policies; Coordination of anti-corruption initiatives at the country level; Implementation and monitoring of the UN Convention against Corruption; and Knowledge codification and measuring performance. 	 anti-corruption as one of the core elements of the Government's agenda. A multi-donor project; SACHARIT (it has never been done), designed to support government activities in a number of different sectors and agencies and promote a transparent, honest, and accountable public sector as intended in the overarching National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010. 	• Government ministries/agencies
5	World Bank	 Country Assistance Strategy for Cambodia focused on supporting the government in improving governance as a centrepiece³⁶ through: Social Accountability Agenda; the Bank is working with Government, community groups, and other members of civil society to build a demand for governance reform and reduced corruption in the country, and then assisting the Government to respond to that demand, Public Sector Reform, the Bank is working with other donors and the Government for a more credible budget, more transparent use of resources, and greater efficiency of service delivery, enabling the public to hold Government to pilot civil service employment reform with merit-based pay. Private Sector Development Reform: the Bank is supporting the Government in achieving these challenging goals with a new Trade Facilitation Project, policy advice, technical assistance and donor coordination. 	Transparency and accountability. Community Score Card (health sector) Standard Operating Procedures which include a Procurement Manual and a Financial Management Manual. Stand alone program on anti-corruption	 Public Financial Management Judicial and electoral reform Extractive industry Sub-national reforms (Organic law) Public Administrator Reform Demand Side for Good Governance and Social Accountability (D & D and DFGG) 	DFID, AusAID, SIDA, the EC, France, Germany, Japan, UNDP and the Ministry of Economy and Finance Council of the Ministers MONASRI Arbitration Council Radio National of Kampuchea Ministry of Interior National Assembly
6	JICA	JICA Cambodia will contribute to the promotion of good governance for the issues of "strengthening the rule of law", "strengthening administrative function", "stabilization of people's livelihood and improvement	Transparency and Accountability: ensure to work with the RGC for higher transparency and accountability in their own decision making process.	Development of Basic Laws.	France, AusAID, Canada, ILO, IMF, ADB, Germany, UNDP, UNICEF, USAID, and World Bank

³⁶ Remarks by IAN PORTER, Country Director, The World Bank, Phnom Penh, September 13, 2005

		of public security" and "improving public financial management" ³⁷ .			UNFPA, World Bank, UNDP, ADB World Bank
				 Improving Administrative Capacity Strengthening Official Statistics Demobilization 	UNDP, World Bank Many bilateral Donors contribution through UNDP Trust Fund, Kusanone NGOs, UNICEF, EC, USA, CARE, HI
				 Promoting Gender Mainstreaming Strengthening Mine Action 	World Bank, ADB, IMF, EC, AusAID, SIDA, France, DFID
				Improving Public SecurityPublic Financial Management	
7	USAID	 USAID programmatic engagement³⁸ in fighting corruption in Cambodia: Build political will to pass anti-corruption law (prime objective). Work with civil society to demand for good governance (demand side) and will move to supply side after the law is passed, will turn the focus on building the capacity of the anti-corruption unit. Work with partner intermediary organization, Pact, One Million Signature campaign to appeal the government to pass anti-corruption law and fight corruption and other also awareness promotion (Clean Hand Campaign) 	Stand alone anti-corruption unit	 Improved Political and Economic Governance Health and Education Human right Private sector development Local governance Judicial and legal reform Increased Competition in Cambodian Political Life 	American Center for International Labor Solidarity, EWMI, TAF, Pact Cambodia, IRI, NDI, DAI, Wild Aid, Nathan- MSI Group American Center for International Labor Solidarity, EWMI, TAF, Pact Cambodia, IRI, NDI, DAI, Wild Aid, Nathan- MSI Group, D-Cam, International Organization Immigration
8	AUSAID	The goal for the Cambodia Australia Development Cooperation Program is: to Advance Australia's national interest through contributing to poverty reduction and sustainable development in Cambodia. The three strategic development objectives ³⁹ for the programme are:	Performance measuresMeans of verification for each program outcome	 Public Financial Management Demand for Good Governance, DFGG 	DFID, World Bank, SIDA, the EC, France, Germany, Japan, UNDP and the Ministry of Economy and Finance World Bank, Ministry of Interior,

 ³⁷ See JICA: JICA Country Program (2005-2008) for Cambodia, May 2005, 3.Principles of JICA Cooperation, 3-1 Cooperation Policy and Priority Areas, 3-1.2 Priority Areas, 3-1.2.1 Promotion of Good Governance, page 11-15
 ³⁸ Interview with USAID: Reed Aeschliman, Roy Fenn, and Socheata Vong
 ³⁹ See AusAID: Australia-Cambodia Development Cooperation Strategy 2003-2006, published by AusAID, Canberra, June 2003

		 To increase the productivity and incomes of the rural poor; To reduce the vulnerability of the poor; and To strengthen the rule of law Strengthen the rule of law: Specific objective1: help develop a strong representative parliament Build capacity of civil society and make space for public participation, Legal reform. Specific objective2: strengthen justice, ensuring transparency and equitable access Enable access to information, Strengthen National Audit Authority Specific Objective3: increase effectiveness Key areas for policy engagement Promoting an electoral environment free of violence and intimidation Promoting judicial reform Implementing public administration reform and public expenditure management reforms 		 Legal and Judicial reform (Justice Program) Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Process (recently has come to an end) 	Council of the Ministers, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Affairs and Youth Rehabilitation UNDP
9	CIDA	Democratic governance is a cornerstone of Canada's international assistance program. CIDA works to build effective, accountable governments, promote democratic participation, and ensure equality and non-discrimination both at the country and regional levels. Its investments in this area are focused on four core areas ⁴⁰ : political freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and accountable public institutions	Procurement	 Cambodia-Canada Legislative Support Project (2001-2010) Public Financial Management Parliamentarian and electoral process Land titling (working with GTZ) 	National Assembly, Senate World Bank
10	DANIDA	The present overall Danish development cooperation policy, "Partnership 2000", states: "Denmark's development policy will promote good governance and administrative practices free of corruption as an essential element in the creation of pro-poor growth ⁴¹ ". Good Governance is, together with human rights, democratization and popular participation, one of the	 Zero tolerance⁴³ Transparency and Accountability Accounting manual, ask NGOs to comply with the code of conduct established by CCC 	 Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance Programme 2006- 2008: Support to the development of local capacity to prevent human rights violations and to promote local justice 	Buddhism for Development

 ⁴⁰ http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/FRA-92513128-MYG#a6
 ⁴¹ See Danida Action Plan to Fight Corruption 2003-2008

		three cross-cutting priority issues in Danish development cooperation ⁴² .		• Support to monitoring and investigation of human rights violations	Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC)
				 Support to provision of legal aid in cases of domestic violence and land disputes Support to documentation, publication and awareness 	Cambodian Defenders' Project (CDP)
				 raising on the Khmer Rouge Support to increased public awareness of corruption and the capacity of civil society to perform watchdog functions 	Cambodia (DCCAM) Centre for Social Development (CSD)
				Support to Provincial Advocacy Networks and Commune Councils	Star Kampuchea
				Human Rights and Good Governance Programme 2009- 2010:	
				• Support to the RGC's Anti- Corruption Body	The RGC's Anti-Corruption Body
11	GTZ	 The two tasks for German development cooperation are therefore defined as follows: 1. Support of the reform process in public administration and interaction with the people so as to establish an efficient environment conducive to enhancing comprehensive poverty reduction and sustainable growth. 2. Support in establishing a social balance where all players –people, civil society, executive, 	Transparency and accountabilityLegal Basis	 Administration Reform and Decentralization Project () D & D) Rural Development Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) 	NCDD, Ministry of Interior, Council for Administrative Reform (CAR), Council for Legal and Judicial Reform (CLJR), other donors
		legislative and judicative branch – exercise their rights and discharge their duties in accordance with the principles of human rights.		Helping Parliament and Senate	

⁴³ See Danida Anti-Corruption – Code of Conduct ⁴² Danida's Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance Programme 2006-2008 & 2009-2010 for Cambodia, focusing on two components : Access to Justice and Transparency and Accountability

	 German support focuses on three areas of action⁴⁴: 1. Administration Reform and Decentralization: Decentralization and communal development are 	• Ambusement (One window service program)	
	meant to establish greater proximity between the people and the state, raise the legitimacy and responsibility of state action, and provide local	• Support to the National Audit Authority	National Audit Authority
	public services in a more efficient manner. German development cooperation supports the pertinent institutions in the legal and organizational formation of the decentralization	Judicial Reforms	
	process. 2. Transparency and Public Accountability: Because		
	of inadequate legal certainty, deficits in the		
	division of powers and the functioning of the		
	control institutions, and also because of the		
	endemic corruption, government activities cannot		
	be predicted reliably. German development		
	cooperation measures in this field of action are		
	designed to contribute to strengthening the role		
	and the mandate of selected democratic		
	supervisory institutions so that these are		
	autonomous in discharging their function in a		
	system of checks and balance. This includes the		
	Parliament, the Audit Office, the Ministry of		
	Planning, and the anti-corruption authority.		
	3. Civil Society and the Rule of Law: German		
	development cooperation supports selected non-		
	governmental organizations and independent media by promoting the rights of women, children		
	and youth their equality of status, personal		
	freedom and self-determination are to be		
	embedded in the up to now –strongly patriarchal		
	Cambodian society.		

⁴⁴ Cambodian-German Development Cooperation on Strategic Framework for Cross-Sectional Assignment "Democracy, Civil Society and Public Administration" **Good Governance**, July 2007

12	EC	The main concentration of the strategy the EC will also fund activities to support to co-operation and dialogue in the field of governance and human rights in order to promote constructive dialogue and stimulate co-operation between the RGC and the EC in a wide range of areas of mutual interest, in particular in the areas of governance, legal and judicial reform (including possible further support to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal), institution building, administrative reform (including the fight against corruption) decentralization and deconcentration, support for the election process, support for the country's efforts to alleviate the impact on the State and society of the contamination by mines and to fight the trafficking and control the spread of illicit small arms and light weapons, support to tackle problems related to trafficking of drugs and human beings, the role of civil society (including social partners) as well as human rights and core labor standards ⁴⁵ .	 Budget Support (pooling funds) Joint Programme with other donors in Public Financial Management Standard Operating Procedures which include a Procurement Manual and a Financial Management Manual. CSOs working in good governance in particular fighting corruption 	 Poverty Reduction Support Operation (PRGO) Public Administration Reform (PAR) MBPI Land Reform Natural Resource Management Decentralization and Deconcentration Reform (D & D) and Organic Law Education Health Agriculture Trade Public Financial Management Reform 	World Bank, Japan, DFID, Canada and the Ministry of Economy and Finance World Bank, AusAID, SIDA, DFID, France, Germany, Japan, UNDP and the Ministry of Economy and Finance
13	France	 Strategic goals of French development cooperation focus on three areas⁴⁶: State of law, good governance, government official capacity development, strengthening and enhancing legal implementation; Higher education, researches, promoting cultural exchange, francophone, structure of CSOs; and Achieve MDGs in some priority areas: agriculture, food security, health, Fighting AIDS, environment and biodiversity. 		 Public Financial Management Public Administration Reform Supporting Rule of Law 	World Bank, AusAID, SIDA, DFID, EC, Germany, Japan, UNDP and the Ministry of Economy and Finance Council of the Ministers Ministry of Justice

 ⁴⁵ See European Community: *Cambodia – European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013*, The EC Response Strategy, page 25-26, Annex 4. EC Co-operation with Cambodia: Governance and Democratization, page 36
 ⁴⁶ See: <u>www.ambafrance-kh.org/spip.php?rubrique1</u>

Annex 2: Overview of publications

•	Title	Purpose/Objective	Author/s	Year of Publication	Publishing or Commissioning Institution/s
01	Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes: Cambodia	The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the relevance of DFID's strategy in Cambodia and the performance of the programme with respect to that strategy.	Paul Thornton, Dane Rogers, Chan Sophal, Chris Vickery	February 2009	UK/DFID
02	USAID Anticorruption Strategy	To reduce opportunities and incentives for corruption; supports stronger and more independent judiciaries, legislatures, and oversight bodies; and promotes independent media, civil society, and public education.	USAID, Washington DC	January 2005	US/USAID
03	Cambodian Corruption Assessment	To assess corrupt practice in Cambodia, that in fact it has reached "pandemic" proportions.	Michael M. Calavan, Sergio Diaz Briquets, Jerald O'Brien	May-June 2004	USAID/Washington & Casals and Associates
04	Assessment of Corruption in Cambodia's Private Sector	The primary objective of this study is to raise the awareness of the private sector, particularly micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) about the causes, nature and extent of corruption in the country with the publication and dissemination of research findings through seminars or conferences.	Sok Hach	July 2006	Economic Institute of Cambodia
05	Living Under the Rule of Corruption: Analysis of Everyday of Corrupt Practices in Cambodia	The objective of the study was to document and analyze everyday forms of corrupt practice at the local level where citizens deal with civil servants in the local bureaucracy and institutions.	Christine J. Nissen	March 2005	Center for Social Development
06	Corruption and Cambodian Households	To be a source of ordinary citizens' voices in the Cambodian corruption debate.		March 2005	Center for Social Development
07	Anti-Corruption: Practice Note	This practice note aims to provide a framework to develop UNDP's approaches and interventions and facilitate the knowledge on ATI and anti-corruption, as a cross- cutting issue in the over-all democratic governance community of practice.		February 2004	UNDP
08	United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2006- 2010	To outline the need for action in the following priority areas: good governance and the promotion and protection of human rights, agriculture and rural poverty, capacity building and human resources development for the social sector, and development of the National Strategic Development Plan.		February 2005	UNDP
09	Anti-Corruption: Our Framework policies and strategies				ADB

				0001	
10	Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: <i>The</i> <i>Legal and</i> <i>Institutional</i> <i>Frameworks for</i> <i>Fighting Corruption</i> <i>in Twenty-One</i> <i>Asian and Pacific</i> <i>Countries</i>	To provide a tool to measure progress over time and serves to disseminate good practices and experiences throughout the region.		2004	ADB
11	Anti-corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific	Providing different action plans to fight corruption	ADB	2001	ADB
12	Strategic for Development Cooperation with Cambodia	Providing different scopes and strategies of cooperation in Cambodia	SIDA/Government offices of Sweden	2008	SIDA
13	Country Strategy and Program midterm Review: Cambodia 2005- 2009	Country analysis	ADB	2005	ADB
14	The current Landscape for Demand-Side Governance Programming in Cambodia	Mapping the current demand-side for good governance in Cambodia among donors and INGOs.	Lauren Loveland The Asia Foundation (TAF)	2009	The Asia Foundation (The report is not officially released yet)
11	Comments at the First Meeting of the Fourth Legislature Cabinet		Prime Minister Hun Sen	26 Sept 2008	The Councils of the Ministers
12	Address by Samedech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia on "Rectangular Strategy" for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase II	For Fourth Legislature of the National Assembly	Prime Minister Hun Sen	26 Sept 2008	The Councils of the Ministers
13	Address by Samedech Hun Sen on the "Rectangular Strategy" for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency	For Third Legislature of the National Assembly	Prime Minister Hun Sen	16 July 2004	The Councils of the Ministers
14	Report on Anti- Corruption Unit Activities 1999- 2009 and Way forward for 2010- 2013		Anti-Corruption Unit/Council of the Ministers		The Councils of the Ministers

15	Policy Brief on			November	Economic Institute of
	Local Public			2006	Cambodia
	Services:				
	Performance and				
	Unofficial Fees				
16	Policy Brief on			July 2006	Economic Institute of
	Assessment of				Cambodia
	Corruption in				
	Cambodia's Private				
	Sector				
17	Perceiving and	The aim of this study was to		February 2007	Pact Cambodia
	Fighting Corruption	describe how Cambodians			
	in Cambodia	perceive corruption in their			
	<u> </u>	country			
18	Oil and Gas in	The aim of this report was to		February 2007	Pact Cambodia
	Cambodia	present issues relating to oil and			
		gas in Cambodia to help Civil			
		Society identify what roles should			
		Civil Society undertake what			
		activities can be done in the			
		present, expertise, information			
		and what support will be needed			
10	Eviatian	relating to oil and gas. To conclude with a brief review of			De et Cembedie
19	Existing Machaniama for			January 2007	Pact Cambodia
	Mechanisms for	the informal mechanisms that are			
	Addressing	used at the village and commune			
	Corruption	level to cope and respond to			
20	Local Public	corruption To find out where commune level	Sieng Deline, Hor	November	Pact Cambodia
20	Services:	service provision directly affects	Chamroeun and	2006	Fact Camboula
	Performance and	households' livelihoods and the	You Sethy	2000	
	Unofficial Fees	current reality of unofficial fees in	Tou Genty		
	Onomolal 1 CCS	order to find the best			
		opportunities for institutional			
		reforms.			
21	Report on an	To find out a main responsible	Chea Kimsan	November	Pact Cambodia
	Investigation into	person in illegal logging in		2006	
	Illegal logging in	Virachey National Park and bring			
	Virachey National	the person to court.			
	Park, Rattankiri				
22	Fighting Corruption			September	Pact Cambodia
	in Cambodia: The			2005	
	Demand for an				
	international				
	Standard Anti				
	Corruption Law in				
	Cambodia				
23	Strengthening			January 2007	World Bank
	World Bank Group				
	Engagement on				
	Governance and				
	Anticorruption				
	(Consultation				
	Feedback)				
24	UNDP Country			October 2005	UNDP
	Programme for the				
	Kingdom of				
	Cambodia 2006-				
	2010				

25	The Cambodia	The purpose of this note is to		February 2007	World Bank and
	Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) Project: An Updated Storyline	build on that project concept note and provide an update about what the DFGG project is aiming to do, what ground realities and lessons have informed the design, and what are likely to be the project's core components.			Ministry of Interior
26	France Development Cooperation in Cambodia	Provide an overview of France's Development Cooperation in Cambodia	Website of France Embassy		France
27	JICA Country Program (2005- 2008) Cambodia		JICA Team	May 2005	Japan/JICA
28	Human Rights and Good Governance Programme (2009- 2010) Cambodia: Programme Document	Contribute to the central elements of the RGC's National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 to enhance the rule of law, promote respect for human rights and democracy as well as foster good governance in Cambodia.		January 2009	Danida
29	Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance Programme (2006- 2008) Cambodia: Programme Document	 The development objective of the HRDGG programme is to contribute to the central elements of the Rectangular Strategy of the RGC aimed at enhancing the rule of law, promoting respect for human rights and democracy in order to create an environment (political and security) conducive to sustainable development in the long run. The immediate objective of the HRDGG programme is to increase the protection of and respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law and to improve transparency and accountability. 		November 2006	Danida
30	Danida Action Plan to Fight Corruption 2003-2008	The Action Plan is intended as a framework for Danish development assistance interventions for fighting corruption. It aims at reducing corruption as part and parcel of efforts to reduce poverty in the countries in which Danish aid funds are being used.		December 2003	Danida
31	Danida Anti- Corruption-Code of Conduct	To ensure and support behaviour and working ethics characterized by high standards of personal and organizational integrity, both internally and with partners			Danida

		1		
32	Cambodia – European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007- 2013	This paper summarizes the challenges faced by Cambodia, the context in which assistance is to be provided, and sets down corresponding objectives and priorities for European Community (EC) support for Cambodia together with an indication of the means to be used to provide aid.		European Community
33	Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (2007- 2010)	EC supports in the 2007-2010 MIP will focus on two key sectors with the single objective of contributing to poverty alleviation in Cambodia, namely: (i) Support to the NSDP and (ii) Support to Basic Education. Additional actions in the field of trade-related assistance and to support EC- Cambodia Co-operation and Dialogue in the field of Governance and Human Rights are also provided for in this MIP.		European Community
34	Country Assistance Plan for Cambodia	It sets out how DFID aim to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs in Cambodia, which starts from the basis of Cambodia's poverty reduction strategy and sets out in detail how DFID will work as part of the international development effort to support a country's strategy for reducing poverty and also include a framework for annual assessment of DFID's performance in implementing the plan.	November 2005	UK/DFID
35	List of donors support to governance and administration by project		02 January 2010	Cambodia ODA Database of the CDC
36	ODA Profile for year 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 in Governance and Administration Sector Profile		02 January 2010	Cambodia ODA Database of the CDC
37	Cambodian- German Development Cooperation Strategic Framework for Cross-Sectional Assignment "Democracy, Civil Society and Public Administration"		July 2007	Germany

38	Australia- Cambodia Development Cooperation Strategy			June 2003	AusAID
39	Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-conflict Society	An important study of contemporary Cambodia and the tension between the needs of reconstruction and those of democratization	Joakim Ojendal and Mona Lilja (Edt).	2009	NIASpress
40	Accountability and Neo- Patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature Review		Pak Kimchoeun, Horng Vuthy, Eng Netra, Ann Sovatha, Kim Sedara, Jenny Knowles, and David Craig	2007	CDRI, Phnom Penh

Annex 3: Interviewees

	Name	Institution	Position	Contact
1	Mr. Kem Sambaddth	ADB	Governance officer, Cambodia Resident Mission, ADB	skem@adb.org
2	Ms. Mari Huseby	UNDP	Governance Advisor/Cluster	-
3	Mr. Heng Socheath	UNDP	Programme Analyst	Socheath.heng@undp.org
4	Mr. Karl A Larsson	SIDA	Councilor/Economist	karl-anders.larsson@sida.se
5	Ms. Martina Fors	SIDA	First Secretary/Programme Officer	martina.fors@sida.se
6	Dr. Stephane Gimbert	WB	Economist	-
7	Ms. Janelle Plummer	WB	Governance Consultant	jplummer@worldbank.org
8	Mr. Daniel Adler	WB	Cambodia country office	-
9	Mr. Tom Wingfield	DFID	Governance section	-
10	Mr. Michael Enguist	DANIDA	Governance and Human rights advisor	miensq@um.dk
11	Mr. Kiet Leng Hour	EU	Officer Human Rights and Democracy	Lenghour.KIET@ec.europa.eu
12	Mr. Song Vannsin	EU	Legal program officer	Vannsin.SONG@ec.europa.eu
13	Mr. Men Bunleng	CIDA	Director of Canadian Cooperation Office	director@cco.org.kh
14	Ms. Katharina Huebner	GTZ	Governance	katharina.huebner@gtz.de
15	Mr. Roy Fenn	USAID	Governance Technical Advisor	refenn@usaid.gov
16	Mr. Reed Aeschliman	USAID	Governance	-

Table 8: Disbursements by Sector : 2002 - 2009(in millions of US \$)

	2002		2003		2004	04	20	2005	2	2006		2007		2008	80		2009		2002-2009	9
Sector	Actual		Actual	-	Actual	ual	Ac	Actual	Ac	Actual		Actual		Actual	ual	Es	Estimates	S	Total Disbursements	ments
	% \$SN	c	\$SN	%	\$SN	%	\$SN	%	\$SN	%	C,	\$SN	%	\$SN	%	\$SN		%	\$ SN	%
Health	67.6 12.7		83.1	15.4	95.9	17.3	110.3	3 18.1	1 109.0	0 15.3		106.0	13.8	100.6	11.9	12	126.8	14.8	799.3	14.8
Education	68.9 13.0		75.0	13.9	73.4	13.2	69.3	3 11.4	4 79.7	7 11.2		89.8	11.7	77.9	9.2	8	82.3	9.6	616.3	11.4
Agriculture	37.0 7	7.0	37.8	7.0	45.3	8.1	33.8	5.5	5 123.5	5 17.3		46.6	6.1	53.6	6.4	6	67.1	7.8	444.6	8.2
Manufacturing, Mining Trade	1.5 0.	ω.	1.7	0.3	7.0	1.3	10.0	0 1.6	5 24.2	ω	.4	16.3	2.1	46.7	5.5		10.3	1.2	117.6	2.2
Rural Development	50.0 9	.4	35.9	6.7	60.5	10.9	50.0) 8.2	2 49.9	9 7.0		69.0	9.0	62.9	7.5	5	56.4	6.6	434.6	8.0
Banking and Business Services	0.0		0.0		0.0		12.7	7 2.1	9.7	7 1.4		15.6	2.0	22.8	2.7		11.7	1.4	72.6	1.3
Urban Planning & Management	0.0		0.0		0.0		3.9	9 0.6	5 0.9	9 0.1	<u></u>	2.0	0.3	4.5	0.5		5.1	0.6	16.4	0.3
Information and Communications	1.5 0	.3	1.2	0.2	1.2	0.2	0.9	9 0.1	9.9	9 1.4		26.3	3.4	7.2	0.8	2	26.5	3.1	74.6	1.4
Energy, Power & Electricity	6.3 1	1.2	20.3	3.8	12.9	2.3	15.6	5 2.6	5 13.7	7 1.9		12.6	1.6	32.7	3.9	3	30.8	3.6	145.0	2.7
Transportation	78.1 14.7		65.6	12.2	82.0	14.8	73.9	€ 12.1	1 54.8	8 7.7		97.4	12.7	143.0	16.9	14	140.2	16.4	734.9	13.6
Water and Sanitation	15.0 2	.8	22.9	4.2	4.9	0.9	24.5	5 4.0	18	.2 2.6		17.2	2.2	18.5	2.2	2	21.0	2.5	142.3	2.6
Community and Social Welfare	64.1 12.1		81.0	15.0	43.7	7.9	35.3	3 5.8	3 38.5	5	.4 5	52.8	6.9	17.5	2.1	1	13.4	1.6	346.5	6.4
Culture & Arts	14.2 2.7		15.9	3.0	18.4	3.3	4.8	3 0.8	3 14.1	1 2.0	.0	7.3	0.9	7.3	0.9		5.6	0.7	87.6	1.6
Environment and Conservation	15.3 2	.9	18.2	3.4	19.6	3.5	12.3	3 2.0	14.6	6 2.0	.0	8.8	1.1	5.8	0.7		8.0	0.9	102.5	1.9
Gender	0.0		0.0		0.0		2.6	5 0.4	3	.8 0.5	. 5	4.8	0.6	4.9	0.6		4.2	0.5	20.3	0.4
HIV/AIDS	0.0		0.0		0.0		25.4	4 4.2	2 35.4	Б	.0	42.0	5.5	46.1	5.5	4	42.4	5.0	191.2	3.5
Governance & Administration	101.0 19	.0	58.4	10.8	46.8	8.4	67.3	3 11.0	96.8	13	.6 10	102.4	13.4	116.4	13.8	10	106.8	12.5	696.0	12.9
Tourism	0.0		0.0		0.0		1.2	2 0.2	2	.5 0	.4	2.9	0.4	4.9	0.6		4.8	0.6	16.4	0.3
Budget & BoP Support	0.0		0.0		0.0		11.1	1 1.8	8			36.0	4.7	21.9	2.6	2	23.3	2.7	92.3	1.7
Emergency & Food Aid	0.0		0.0		0.0		3.0	0 0.5	0	.4 0.1	<u></u>	1.9	0.2	2.6	0.3		2.3	0.3	10.3	0.2
Other	10.3 1	1.9	22.4	4.2	43.9	7.9	42.0) 6.9	13	.4 1	.9	9.2	1.2	46.3	5.5	6	66.1	7.7	253.6	4.7
Total Disbursements	530.9 100		539.5	100	555.4	100	610.0	0 100	713.2	2 100		766.8	100	844.1	100	855.0		100	5,414.9	100

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200	
Sector:	
VBLE 9: Disbursements by Donor and S	(in thousands of US Dollars)
TA	

Major Donor	Term Hea	Health	Edu. A	Agri. Mar	Man., Min., H Trade	Rural B Dev.	Banking Urban Plan. & Biz & Mana.		Inf. & Ene. Com. Pow. &	ne. Trans. v. &	Mater & 1	er & Comm. ation & Social	m. Culture cial & Art	ure Enviro. & urt Conservation		Gender HIV/ AIDS	V/ Gov. & DS Adm.	& Tourism	sm Budget/ BoP	t/ Emer. & Food Aid	Other	TOTAL
Inited Nations Aconsiss		-			_													_				
Programs Delivered : Total	Grant 11	11,309	10,780	3,684	489	17,618	120	0	0	0	666	1,419 7,	7,160 1,	1,634	2,350	901 5	5,182 11,476	476	0	0	0 16,414	91,204
				4,624	0	0	0	0	0				-	0	0			0	0	0		5,612
Own resources disbursed	Grant 8	8,249 0	6,026 0	3,684	466	5,153	120	0 0	0 0	0 0	0666	1,361 5, 0	5,531 1, 0	1,634 0	2,256	901 5	5,177 5,5 0	5,548	0 0	0 0	0 343	47,116 A 62A
Int'l Financial Institutions		>		+20,4	Þ	>	>	>	5	>	>	>	>	>	>	>	>	>	>	>		+ 70,+
IBRD/World Bank	Grant 2	2,378	4,265	0	848	38	0	0				195	0	0	158	0		1,929	0 15,495	5	0	25,432
-			3,009	0	0 0	2,986	0	0	0			3,285	0	0	73	0	0 2'0	7,072	0	0		22,036
International Monetary Fund			0	0	0	0	5.25	0 0					0 ,00	0 0	0	0	τ	393		0		616
Asian Development Bank	Grant 1	1,339 1,339 1	1,513	519 3.065	609	166 700	940 10 583	0 0	539 0 3	245 A	382 382 8 048	2,994 I.	080	0 0	302 2 162	3/9		1,305 3.	0 2 644	0 0		12,608
Others				ron'r	Þ	201 [°] C	coc'01	>				000'7	>	>	7, 102	>			*+0	>		cc/'0c
Global Fund	Grant			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 13,	302	0	0	0	0 0	21,067
Sub-Total: UN Angencies & IFI's	Grant	19,731 1	11,804	4,203	1,824	5,748	1,585	0	539	370 1,(1,049 4,	4,551 6,6	6,617 1,	1,634	2,716 1	1,280 18,	18,480 9,1	9,175	0 15,495	5	0 343	107,142
	Loan 7,	7,465 16	16,762	7,689	0	8,695	10,583	0	0 4,	4,685 9,0	9,637 6,	6,135	0	0	2,235	0	0 6,8	6,885 2,0	2,644	0	0	83,415
	TOTAL 27,	27,196 28	28,566 1	11,892	1,824	14,442	12,168	0	539 5,	5,055 10,	10,686 10	10,686 6,6	6,617 1,0	1,634	4,951 1	,280 18,	480 16,061		2,644 15,495	5	0 343	190,557
EUROPEAN UNION																						
European Commission		2,771	7,055	2,484	6,033	7,796	400	0	0	0	0		1,198	0	837		2,060 5,6	5,699	0 6,821	1 20	4 199	43,966
Belgium	Grant		2,102	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0 5,048	7,150
Denmark	Grant	0		1,439	0	1/26	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0		7,399	0	0	0	9,809
Finland	Grant	0	539	32	0	2,288	0	0	0	0	0		1,774	0	0	82	0	36	0	0		5,205
France	Grant		2,610	3,817	1,374	0	0	152	62	225				2,808	133	-		1,503	0	0	32	17,889
(0	0 0	0 0	0 00	0	0	0	0	0		3,805 ĵ	0	0 0	0 0	0 0		0	0	0 0		3,805
Germany		2,783	0;	; 0	2,027	10,055	1,459	0 0	131	1/9	0 0	0 2	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0		3,146	0 0	0		19,789
	Grant	77	10	01	0 0	0	0 0	<u> </u>	0 000	0 0	<u> </u>		0 101	<u> </u>	0 - 10	0 100	, , ,	776	0 1	0.0		1001
	linan		0	074		700	0 0	0 0	700				5		0	120		0/0			~	3, 100
Sweden	Grant		7,740	0 0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0	9,599	0	0	-	17,343
United Kingdom				2,581	0	4,554	0	0	39	0	0	0	93	0	0			4,651	10	0	0 357	23,656
Other EU Member States	Grant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0
Sub-Total: EU	Grant	12,980 27	21,390 10	10,790	9,434	26,346	1,859	152	614	404	0	766 5,0	5,057 2,8	2,808	1,188 1	,272 6,823	23 32,429	67t	44 6,821	1 504	4 6,393	148,076
	Loan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 3	3,805	0	0	0	0 0		0	0	0	0 377	4,181
	TOTAL 12,	12,980 27	21,390 10	10,790	9,434	26,346	1,859	152	614	404	0 4	4,571 5,0	5,057 2,8	2,808	1,188 1	1,272 6,	6,823 32,429	129	44 6,821	1 504	4 6,770	152,257
MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS																						
Australia	Grant			6,542	0	4,503	903	0	0	0	0		2,761	0	0	540		8,817	0			26,758
Canada	Grant	436	816	2,118	299	2,536	35	0	0		0	49	0	0	478	728	416 3,(3,079	0	0 1,386		12,376
China	Grant	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		122			295	20	0		0	0	0		436
	roan		" 	 	- 	0 	" " " "	 	8,849	0 42,	42,189	0 26,	26,219	 	" 	 	0	$\frac{14,753}{=}$	 	" -	0 	92,010
Japan				10,320	137	10,036	0				30,523	966		2,337	1,415	940		9,631		4	2	101,268
		-				0	 	 	0		7,425			 	 			0	0 8,523			15,948
New Zealand	_1	56	608	2,201	 	115	0	 	0	 	 	_	537	 		 		520	204	0	0 172	4,520
Republic of Korea			1,263	0	7	2,575	009		0		7		1,208	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8,295
		0	0 0	484	0	0 0	0 0	0 10	16,044		6,432	0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0		0		22,959
Switzerland United States of America	Grant 2	2,124	2 671	0 0	156 2 70A	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	861	0	0 0	0 0 0 14.048 14.782	0	0 0	0 0	0 202	3,583
Sub-Total: Bilateral Donors	Grant	2	_	21.180	4.382	19.766	1.538			_				2.830		· ·	_		258 5.114	4 1.386	1.66	215.377
	Loan	0	0	484	0	0	0	0 24	24,892	0 56,	56,046	0 26.2	26,219	0	0	0	0 14,753	753	0 8,523	0	0	130,917
		29,162 27	21,612 2	21,664	4,382	19,766	1,538	1,804 25,		7,151 86,		1,959 30,7		2,830	2,356 2	2,209 16,	16,683 53,583		258 13,636	6 1,386	6 1,661	346,294
Non-Governmental Organization				100	20			•	•	0	5			4	000	4		6				
(Core/Own Resources Only)	Grant 36,	30,000	. 2/2/81	9/7'7	030	/64/8	D	D	0	-	43	0 10':	10,346	D	322	5	D	539	D	D	0 380	11,130
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS	TOTAL 106,	106,003 89	89,840 44	46,622	16,275	69,012	15,565	1,956 26,	26,313 12,	12,610 97,	427	17,215 52,8	52,814 7,	7,272	8,817 4	4,760 41,	41,986 102,412		2,946 35,953	3 1,890	0 9,154	766,843
				-			-	-	-	-					-							

	TOTAL DISBUDSEMENTS	Non-Governmental Organization (Core/Own Resources Only)			Sub-Total: Bilateral Donors	United States of America	Switzerland	Republic of Korea		lew Zealand	Japan	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =		, bina	Australia	MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS			Sub-Total: EU	Other EU Member States	United Kingdom	Sweden	Spain	Netherlands	Germany	France	Finland	Denmark	EUROPEAN UNION European Commission Beloium			Sub-Total: UN Angencies & IFI's	Global Fund	• Asian Development balls	International Monetary Fund	IBRD/World Bank	11 Einancial Institutions	Own resources disbursed	Inited Nations Agencies Programs Delivered : Total	
	TOTAL	Grant	TOTAL	Loan	-	Grant	Crant	Grant		Grant	Loan	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant	Crant	TOTAL	Loan	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	TOTAL	Loan	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant	
100,020	002 001	0	27,669		27,669	15,961	3 7 7 0	000			0	5.319	0 0	0 .	2,147	7 1 1	22,201	0	22,201	0	8,673	0 0	0	4	0 5,174	2,764	0	0 0	5,586	50,758	8,672	42,086	21,001	5,818	0	3,113	0	0 15,082	21,817	
11,001	F70 LL	0	19,336	0	19,336	1,603	<u> </u>	3,5U4 n		1.125	0	10.275	0 0	D .	831	1 000	31,923	0	31,923	0	133	0 5,894	295	ω	0 8,654	3,809	630	0	10,339	26,608	6,781	19,827	0	4,859	0	6,558	0	U 11,986	15,699	
440,00	5 500	0	26,122	6,198	19,924	0 0	0,170	4 1 08		1.078	0	12 818	0 0	0	3,443 2 5.84	5 6 Å Å	9,045	0	9,045	0	2,641	0 0	204	4	0 0	3,123	35	783	2,255	18,433	14,178	4,255	0	/ 02 11,478	100	940	2,700	2,553	2,553	
40,701	14 701	0	9,420	0	9,420	7,921	л с				0	1.353	0 0	<u> </u>	88 0	>	8,565	0	8,565	0	0	0 0	0 0	0	0 177	1,882	0	0	6,505	28,716	26,450	2,266	0	473 26,450	1 0 0	811	0	086 0	086	
02,420	2000	0	19,896	0	19,896	0 0		2,317	 		0	= = = = 1.688	0 0	0,70	3 060	E 70(27,274	0	27,274	0	5,788	0 0	1,108	0	0 8,433	0 0	4,062	1,181	6,702 0	15,756	8,136	7,619	0	3,400 5,331	0 2 200	1,335 2 005	0	0 2,876	17,625	
0 22,041		0 0	6 1,298		6 1,298			a		<u> </u>			000		420		4 58	0	4 58						3 0					6 21,491		9 569		0 20,922						
4,470			8 2,138		8 2,138		<u> </u>	1,4				 			- 0	0	8 2,333		8 2,333	0	0	00	00	0	<u>8</u> C	0 2,333		00	00			9	0	2 4	<u>) o c</u>	0	0	00	0	
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14 32,100		0	46 9,380	8	658 9	0 0	<u> </u>	222			~		0 0	<u> </u>		>	578 2	0	578 2	0	0	00	487		0 0	0	0	0 0	90 1	251 23,027	0 22,405	251 6		0 13,406			0	35 0	, 0	
00 142,902		0	80 119,281		985 24,317	0 0			-1-				0 87,122	<u> </u>		>	293	0	293	0	0	0 0	0	0	141	0	0	0 0	0	27 23,620		623 3,836		19				0 3,1		_
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11 100		0	1,441 4,	0	1,441 4	0 0	<u> </u>	U 887	2 	0 (0	104	00	<u> </u>	0 0 0		7,703 6,	5,664	2,038 6,	0	0	0 0	0		0 0			0 0	449	9,356 6,		7,243 6,	0	0 007'C	z, 114	420	0	,555 5,	1,848 5,	-
200	5	0	580		,580 1	0 0		0 C/ 4		113	0	2 	0 0	<u> </u>	0,4/0	170	534	0	534	0	28	0 0	491	1,312	00	2,383	1,744	0 0	576	389	0	389	0	0	0	0	0	435	5,604	
1,200	2001	0	1,541	0	1,541	0	21 0	<u> </u>		<u>, c</u>	0 0	<u> </u>	0 0	<u> </u>	0	710	4,423	0	4,423	0	0	0 0	0	0	0 0	4,423	0	0 0	0 0	1,322	0	1,322	0	0 0	000	0 0	0	U 1,322	812	_
3,700	E 740	0	851	0	851	44	<u> </u>	0 0	 _ _	 	0	= 	0 0	0	л <u>84</u>	>	1,230	0	1,230	0	0	0 0	533	0	0 0	277	0	0	420	3,687	1,411	2,276	0	207 1,411	0 0	732	0	0 1,338	1,443	
C/0,4	A 0.7E	0	1,447	0	1,447	0 0			 <u></u>	 	0	341	0 0	D .	200	200	2,172	0	2,172	0	384	0 0	1,477	0	0 0	0	118	0 0	193	1,256	0	1,256	0	4 ³³	0	0	0	800 U	230	
40,002	A4 0E0	0	17,371	0	17,371	16,283			 > «	 	0 %	 %	0 0	D - 5	141	707	4,447	0	4,447	0	2,015	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	1,017	0	0	1,415 0	24,234	0	24,234	17,600	0 0	000	0 0	0	0 6,634	6,704	
1 00,007	112 207	0	47,480	8,068	39,412	13,860		n 33	3 5	359	0	6 108	8,068	, 218	7 248	11 604	40,465	0	40,465	0	6,921	9,963	445	0	3,205	2,280	40	7,722	0 888,6	28,442	591	27,851	0	0 0	12000	9,603	0	0 6,154	17,139	
4,711	1 011	0	144		144	0				144	0	 	0 0				382	0	382	0	0	0 0	382	0	0 0	0			0 0	4,385		0	0	4,385	000	0	0	0 0	0	
21,740	21016	0	19,078	0	19,078	0 0	0 0	0 0	 _ -		0	= = $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$	0 0	<u> </u>		_ 	2,868	0	2,868	0	2,820	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0 48	0	0	0	0	0 0	000	00	0	0 0	, o	
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40,337					15,128	0			_`- 			_					12,903	408	12,495			408			9,645				5 416 652	2,989		2,989) 985) 2,982	=	
044,070		0			2		0 2 026	0 13,29	- - 	3.067		 	0 95,190		0 30,022		13 188,009	8 6,072	5 181,936	0 0		0 15,857	6		0 5,004 5 35,488				6 47,280 2 2,817	9 290,800		9 154,971		0 27,073	0 0 0 0 0	_		5 3,685 12 62,868		

 TABLE 10: Disbursements by Donor and Sector: 2008

 (in thousands of US Dollars)

FABLE 11: Disbursements by Donor and Sector: 2009 (in thousands of US Dollars)		
11: Disbursements by Donor (in thousands of US Don	2009	
11: Disbursements by Donor (in thousands of US Don	Sector:	
Z	11: Disbursements by Donor	of US L

					Man Min	Dural	Banking I Irhan Dlan		Inf & I	Ene	N	lator 8. Cr		Culture	Enviro 8.	Gandar		Cov 8.	a		Emor 8.		
Major Donor	Term	Health	Edu.	Agri.	Trade		& Biz			. ~ð	Trans. Sa	Sanitation & Social			n				Tourism	BoP	Food Aid	Other	TOTAL
United Nations Agencies • Programs Delivered : Total	Grant	32.002	16.293	2.847	1.241	24.388	0	0	20	191	2.972	1,098	4.299	1,690	2.484	1.270	7.667	12.277	0	0	425	13.220	124.414
		0	0	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	3,000
Own resources disbursed		16,440	16,126	2,442	1,129	3,755	0 0	0 0	20	0 0	2,972	1,098	4,299	1,690	2,063	1,270	7,575	5,585	0 0	0 0	425	4,786	71,705
Int'l Einancial Institutions	Loan	0	0	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,000
IBRD/World Bank	Grant	1,099	14,042	700	1,343	1,359	0	0	0	982	0	0	0	0	756	0	0	18,234	0	0	0	8,000	46,515
	Loan	5,239	777	0	0	2,721	0	0	0	8,011	1,620	184	0	0	0	0	0	306	0	0	0	5,000	23,859
International Monetary Fund	Grant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 !	0
Asian Development Bank	Grant	2,800	2,650	400	220	6,780	1,510	0 0	100	250	559	6,300	281	0 0	0	200	0 0	1,200	0	0 0	800	47	24,398
Others	Loan	2,378	6,700	20,606	0	1,300	0	0	0	10,410	15,180	0	0	0	400	0	0	0	4,200	0	0	0	61,174
Global Fund	Grant	32,070	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,813	0	0	0	0	0	47,883
Sub-Total: UN Angencies & IFI's	Grant	52,409	32,818	3,542	2,692	11,895	1,510	0	150	1,232	3,531	7,398	4,580	1,690	2,819	1,770	23,387 2	25,019	0	0	1,225	12,833	190,500
	Loan			23,606	0	4,021	0	0			16,800	184	0	0	400			306	4,200	0	0	5,000	88,033
	TOTAL 6	60,026 4	40,295	27,148	2,692	15,916	1,510	0	150	19,653 2	20,332	7,582	4,580	1,690	3,219	1,770	23,387 2	25,325	4,200	0	1,225	17,833	278,533
EUROPEAN UNION		_									-			-		_		_	_			_	
European Commission	Grant	4,548	7,084	5,018	291	10,296	42	0	47	83	38	307	1,646	0	899	182	1,279	6,499	0	0	755	428	39,442
Belgium	Grant	0	2,612	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	506	3,117
Denmark	Grant	0	0	1/26	0	1,464	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,896	0	0	0	1,870	14,201
Finland	Grant	0	403	0	0	3,060	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,701	0	0	125	0	37	0	0	0	0	6,326
France	Grant	2,857	3,364	2,957	1,794	0	0	2,731	0	0	0	1,325	899	2,885	150	0	362	1,374	0	0	0	183	20,881
Common Com	Loan Cront	0 4 766	0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	3,880	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	3,880
	Grant	0.1,4	0/0/0			0,423		0 0			<u> </u>	<u> </u>	150					0:07		0 0		1,00/	202,02
Spain	Grant	0 0	979	732	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	181	0 0			491	1 002	412	1 389		905	348	0 0	348	534	669.9
	Loan	0	0	0	0	0	9.749	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	384	10.134
Sweden	Grant	0	3,427	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,958	0	0	17,184	0	0	0	0	22,569
United Kingdom		15,323	21	2,471	0	4,790	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	271	1,371	8,513	0	3,876	0	122	36,780
Other EU Member States	Grant			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sub-Total: EU	Grant	27,483	25,269	12,149	2,085	26,533	42	2,731	229	83	38	1,632	5,911	3,887	3,419	1,968	3,012 4	47,245	348	3,876	1,103	11,903	180,945
	Loan	0	0	0	0	0	9,749	0	0	0	0	3,880	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	384	14,014
	TOTAL 2	27,483	25,269	12,149	2,085	26,533	9,791	2,731	229	83	38	5,512	5,911	3,887	3,419	1,968	3,012 4	47,245	348	3,876	1,103	12,288	194,959
MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS				\	<u> </u>			<u></u>	<u> </u>						\		<u> </u>						
Australia	Grant	5,892	2,236	3,129	0	3,254	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,218	0	0	2	809	7,876	0	0	0	0	25,421
Canada	Grant	797	615	2,306	62	2,849	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	601	482	126	5,576	0	0	0	0	13,645
China	Grant	0 0	81	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	2,899	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	2,979
	_ Cogu 	- - 	 	- -	 	= = 	 	 	<u> </u> ^C 	_ _ 	83,062	 ⊂ 	_ [©] [©]	_ _ 	- 	 = 	וו כ 	 = =	_ _ > 	" 	 	_ ^C 	83,062
Japan	Grant .	9,352	8,737	8,810	809	7,790	0	1,618	809	1,618	12,567	888	2 2	0	0	0	0	7,280	0	19,412	0	29,402	109,187
	Loan	0 0	0	0	- - 	0 ; 	 	- <u> </u> - ' 	0 0 1	9,490	11,162	5,468	0 '		 	0	- - -	0	0		- - - - -	6,535	39,256
New Zealand	Prant	- - - 	866	930	- 	33	 	<u> </u> 	 	_ _ 	- - 	 	355	_ _	 	 	ו = 	310	248	- - 		_ _ > 	2,8/4
Republic of Korea	Grant	1,078	2,042	1,603	0 0	50	370	781	0	0 0	868	0 0	239	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	7,001
Land land the second	LUAN	0 1,5 0	<u> </u>	2000'4	0 0	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	0 0	707'07	<u> </u>	2,0/3				0 0	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	0 0	0 0	0 0	<u> </u>		20C,1 C
United States of America		2,703	2.000	1.379	4.632	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	1.551	0 0	n 0	735			0 13.143	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	57.736
Sub-Total: Bilateral Donors	Grant			18,157	5,503	13,945	403	2,399	809	_	16,333	2,439	2,909	5	1,336			34,185	248	19,412	0	29,402	221,615
	Loan	0	0	9,608	0	0	0	0	25,282	9,490 10	103,497	5,468	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,535	159,881
	TOTAL 3	39,290	16,708 2	27,765	5,503	13,945	403	2,399	26,091	11,108 11	119,830	7,907	2,909	5	1,336	490 1	16,025 3	34,185	248	19,412	0	35,937	381,496
Non-Governmental Organization (Core/Own Resources Only)	Grant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS	TOTAI 12	126.799	CLC C8	67.062	10.279	56.395	11.704	5.130	26.470	30.843 1/	140.200	21.001	13 400	5.582	7.975	4 2 27	42.424 10	106.755	4.796	23.288	2.328	66.058	854.988
				ann' In	1110		to rite	20-10			any of		DAL D	Junio	2111			22210		20,200	ATOTA	2001/200	an/ Loo

_	TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS	Non-Governmental Organization (Core/Own Resources Only)			Sub-1	United States of America	Switzerland		Republic of Korea	New Zealand	 	Japan	 	China	Canada	AUSUAIIA	MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS				Other EU Member States	United Kingdom	Sweden		Spain	Netherlands	Germany	France	Finland	Denmark	Belgium	EUROPEAN UNION European Commission			Sub-Total:	Global Fund	Others	Asian Development Bank	International Monetary Fund	IBRD/World Bank	Int'l Financial Institutions	Own resources disbursed	Programs Delivered : Total	Major	
	URSEMENTS	al Organization Irces Only)			Sub-Total: Bilateral Donors	erica				 	 						DONORS			Sub-Total: EU												on			Sub-Total: UN Angencies & IFI's			nt Bank	stary Fund		tions	sbursed	d : Total	Major Donor	
	TOTAL	Grant	TOTAL	Loan	Grant	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant		Grant	Grant	Gall		TOTAL	Loan	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	Grant	TOTAL	Loan	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant	Grant	Loan	Grant	Grant Loan	Term	
	126,166	0	38,673	0	38,673	15,894	2,913	0	0	0	0	5,278	 - -	<u> </u>	, 1997	10,409	13 100	27,904	0	27,904	0	14,052	0	0	0	0	7,777	5,003	0 0	0	0	2,511	59,589	9,848	49,740	27,966	0	2,710	9,848 0	0 0	C	19,065	0 0	Health	
	92,990	0	10,638	0	10,638	2,000	0	0	0	1,166	0	3,735	" - -	0 0	294	3,443	2	23,903	0	23,903	0	20	3,360	0	0	0	8,369	3,/U3	3 705	0	783	7,666	58,449	5,297	53,152	0	4,900	8,996	397 0	28,672	C	15,484	0 0	Edu.	
	72,484	0	28,723	10,410	18,313	2,032	0	10,410	1,000	720	0	7,036	 _ _	0 0	00.6	0,070	1 671	12,391	346	12,045	0	1,689	0	0	731	0	340 0	3,302	3 3 E 3	851	0	5,422	31,370	25,740	5,630	0	24,940	1,050	0 0	2,775	800	1,805	0 0	Agri.	
-	14,815	0	7,242	1,810	5,432	5,432	0	0	0	0	1,810	0	 -	0 0	<u> </u>	0 0	>	4,215	0	4,215	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	492	0	0	0	3,723	3,358	0	3,358	0	0	0	0 0	3,000	C	358	0 0	Trade	Man Min
	60,652	0	10,822	0	10,822	0	0	0	069	28	0	4,451	 c	0 0	4,042	1,011	1 (11	30,227	0	30,227	0	3,404	0	0	0	0	10,831		1,658	1,364	0	12,971	19,603	6,965	12,638	0	5,850	7,540	0	4,033	C	1,065	0 0	Dev.	
	21,103	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	 	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	0_0	>	12,853	12,410	443	0	0	0	12,410	0	0	443	<u> </u>	0 0	0	0	0	8,250	6,500	1,750	0	6,500	1,750	0 0	0	C	0	0 0	& Biz & Mana.	Danking IIrh
	3,870	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	 _			<u> </u>	>	3,870	0	3,870	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	3,870	0 070	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0_0	Mana.	- Dian
	358	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	 	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		>	323	0	323	0	0	0	0	289	0	0 0		0 0	0	0	34	35	0	35	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	C	3 35	0 0	Com.	n Inf & Ene Wa
	76,892	0	9,509	9,509	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,509	0	 	<u> </u>			>	18,713	0	18,713		0	0	0	0	0	18,713		0	0	0	0	48,670	38,970	9,700	0	31,270	0	<i>1, 1</i> 00	9,700	C	0	0 0	Pow. &	32
	172,613	0	99,242	90,745	8,497	0	0	6,559	0	0	19,826	8,497	04,300	0.75.17		~ c	>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0 0	0	0	0	73,371	70,362	3,008	0	58,530	0	11,832 0	0	C	3,008	0 0	Trans.	
-	36,405	0	13,638	11,352	2,286	2,286	0	0	0	0	11,352	0	 	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		>	13,377	9,091	4,286	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,U71 0	3,908	0 020 0	0	0	318	9,390	4,763	4,626	0	0	1,690	4, /63 0	1,085	C	1,851	0 0	Sanitation 8	tor 8.
	9,582	0	2,988	0	2,988	0	0	0	0	455	0	0	 	0 0	<u> </u>	2,000	2	2,175	0	2,175		16	0	0	144	0	0 0	005	3E2 0	0	0	1,659	4,419	0	4,419	0	0	300	0 0	<u>, 0</u>	C	4,119	0 0	& Social	
	4,335	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	 				>	3,252	0	3,252	0	0	0	0	1,349	0	0 0	1,903	0	0	0	0	1,082	0	1,082	0	0	0	0 0	<u>, 0</u>	C	1,082	0 0	& Art	Oulturo.
	7,246	0	1,327	0	1,327	1,016	0	0	0			0	 - -	0 0	312	210	>	4,795	0	4,795	0	0	3,487	0	0	0	0 0	017	0	0	0	1,092	1,124	0	1,124	0	0	0	0 0	282	0	842	0_0	Conservation	Environ 9
	3,880	0	707	0	707	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		<u> </u>	,0/		>	2,759	0	2,759	0	39	0	0	2,530	0	0 0		0 0	0	0	189	415	0	415	0	0	0	0 0	<u>, o</u>	C	415	0 0	Gender	Condor
	35,885	0	12,505	0	12,505	12,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	 <	<u> </u>	20	44/	7	2,618	0	2,618	0	1,453	0	0	0	0	0 0	5/5	375	0	0	789	20,762	0	20,762	13,217	0	0	0 0	<u>, 0</u>	C	7,544	0 0	AIDS	
	131,042	0	24,756	0	24,756	12,700	0	0	0	360	0	0	 c		206	10,734	10 101	39,270	0	39,270	0	4,758	10,774	0	1,227	0	3,909	1,300	0	7,554	0	9,683	67,016	0	67,016	0	0	850	0 0	27,067	C	39,099	0 0	Adm.	David 8.
	5,086	0	612	0	612	0	0	0	0	612	0	0	 	0 0	<u> </u>	> <	>	144	0	144	0	0	0	0	144	0	0 0		0 0	0	0	0	4,330	4,330	0	0	4,330	0	0 0	0 0		<u> </u>	0 0	Tourism	
	12,815	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	 - -	<u> </u>	<u> </u>) <u> </u>		12,815	0	12,815	0	5,600	0	0	0	0	0 0		0 0	0	0	7,215	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	, 0	C	, 0	0 0	BoP	
	1,425	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	 <	<u> </u>		0 0	>	585	0	585	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	<u> </u>	0	0	0	585	840	0	840	0	0	410	0 0	<u> </u>	C	430	0_0	Food Aid	9.
	57,986	0	6,865	1,100	5,765	0	0	0	0	 0	1,100	5,765	 _		, c	~ c	5	21,931	4,222	17,708	0	0	0	4,222	557	1.231	7,864	938	0.00	6,600	442	76	29,190	0	29,190	0	0	1,829	0 0	15,000	C	12,361	0 0	Other	
	947,629		268,248	124,927	143,321	53,359	2,913	16,969	1,690	3,341	 		======================================	0.75. # 7	8,423	30,034	2000	238,120	26,069	212,051	0	31,032	17,621	16,632	6,972	1.231	57,907	24,104	1,658	16,368	1,225	53,934	441,261	172,776	268,485	41,183	136,320	27,125	35,656 0	91,614 35 45 4	800	108	0 0	TOTAL	

 TABLE 12: Disbursements by Donor and Sector: 2010 (in thousands of US Dollars)

Poor governance and corruption are widely acknowledged as major impediments to alleviating poverty and achieving development objectives in Cambodia. In response to this challenging governance environment, international donors have, for some years, devoted a significant part of their assistance to the promotion of good governance and public integrity in the country. This study aims to provide an overview of donor approaches to anti-corruption and integrity reform in Cambodia from 2004 to 2009. It investigates the manner in which donor agencies have conceived of governance and corruption challenges and the programmatic means and dialogue channels they have used to meet them. Some tentative lessons for future donor engagement in this area are provided.

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