The Investment Climate Assessment 2014: Creating Opportunities for Firms in Cambodia
Publication Year: 2015 / Sources: World Bank & Asian Development Bank (ADB)Over the past decade, Cambodia has more than halved its rate of poverty thanks to economic growth averaging 8 percent per annum, strong export performance and positive changes to the investment climate. Exports, dominated by garments, footwear and tourism, are projected to reach almost $8 billion in 2014. The garment industry has played an important role in reducing poverty by creating job opportunities for more than 650,000 workers, mostly young women migrating to Phnom Penh from the countryside.
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Investing in Cambodia
Publication Year: 2015 / Sources: Ministry of CommerceThere are some reasons to invest in Cambodia such as Macroeconomic Stability, Pro-business Government, Competitive Investment Incentives, One-Stop Service Investment Promotion Agency, Preferential Access to Regional & World Markets, Investment Protection, Efficient Infrastructure and Strategic Location, Sound Financial Sector, Abundant Resources, Labor, and Land.
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Cambodia: Addressing The Skills Gap
Publication Year: 2015 / Sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB) & International Labour Organization (ILO)Cambodia has made great strides toward sustained rapid and inclusive economic growth since its political environment stabilized in 1999. Its 7.8% average annual growth since then has dramatically brought down the poverty level, from 47.8% of the population living below the national poverty line in 2007 to a low 18.9% in 2012. However, 71.0% of Cambodians still live on less than $3 a day, which means that many of them remain vulnerable to falling back into poverty.
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Corruption Perceptions In Cambodian Small And Medium Enterprises
Publication Year: 2015 / Sources: Transparency International CambodiaThis report (i) describes the environment in which businesses operate, (ii) identifies and analyses the different ways in which companies experience corruption and the impacts of corruption on them; (iii) assesses the reaction/response of businesses regarding corruption and the existence of specific policies or practices; and finally, (iv) contains policy recommendations on how SMEs and the Government can tackle corruption.
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Corruption and Cambodia’s Governance System: The Need for Reform
Publication Year: 2014 / Sources: Transparency International CambodiaThe Cambodia National Integrity System Assessment provides an evaluation of the state of the country’s governance system. It assesses 13 institutions from the Judiciary to the Anti-Corruption Unit to civil society. A well-functioning National Integrity System safeguards against corruption and contributes to the larger struggle against abuse of power. Corruption undermines good governance, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights. It leads to misuse of resources, cheats citizens, harms the private sector, and distorts financial markets.Yet when governance institutions are characterised by appropriate regulations and accountable behaviour, corruption is less likely to thrive. Transparency International Cambodia has developed key policy recommendations based on the findings of this report. The recommendations, contained within, seek to engage government, donors and civil society to push forward crucial reforms to improve the integrity system. Strengthening the National Integrity System promotes better governance across all aspects of society, and, ultimately, contributes to a more just society overall.
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Trade union strategies towards global production systems
Publication Year: 2009 / Sources: International Journal of Labour Research, Volume 1As its title suggests, the principal objective of the project was to improve working conditions in Cambodia’s textile and apparel sector via the establishment of an independent system for monitoring working conditions, assist in drafting new laws and regulations where necessary, and develop awareness and capacity for employers, workers and government officials to ensure greater compliance with core labour standards and Cambodian labour laws.
Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working To Improve Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Factories
Publication Year: 2014 / Sources: Yale Human Rights and Development Journal, Volume 7The U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement, signed on January20, 1999, was remarkable for its inclusion of a labor standards provision that created incentives for the Cambodian garment industry to bring itself into substantial compliance with international labor standards and Cambodian labor law. The labor standards provision provided the impetus for the creation of a novel program, to be operated by the International Labor Organization (ILO). This program combined trade-related incentives to enforce workers’ rights with an unprecedented plan to have the ILO conduct factory-level monitoring of working conditions. This Article examines how the program was designed and implemented and evaluates the proposals and conceptions that preceded the final project document. This analysis provides a case study on how to construct and implement future programs that combine trade and factory monitoring to improve working conditions and enforce core labor rights along the global supply chain.
Estimation of Rates of Return of Social Protection Instruments in Cambodia: A Case for Non-Contributory Social Transfers
Publication Year: 2012 / Sources: Maastricht University, Council for Agricultural and Rural Development, CARD Royal Government of Cambodia, and United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF – CambodiThe Royal Government of Cambodia launched in 2011 the National Social Protection Strategy for the Poor and Vulnerable (NSPS) in order to contribute to the rehabilitation and stability of the economy, but also to enhance human capital. This study provides empirical evidence for the implementation of the NSPS making the case for a basic package of non-contributory social protection provisions targeted at poor persons in rural areas covering various life-cycle risks. The instruments include cash transfers for children, social pensions, scholarships for lower secondary education, and public works programmes. A microsimulation model is designed using data from the Cambodian Socio Economic Survey 2004 and 2009. The model estimates the potential effects, benefits and returns of the implementation of social protection in Cambodia.
Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Rising Food Prices on the Poor and Vulnerable and Policy Responses in Cambodia
Publication Year: 2012 / Sources: Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI)The increase in global food prices in 2008 has led to significantly higher food prices across developing countries. Having peaked in mid-2008, global food prices have fallen but remain volatile, and local food prices are still high in many countries including in Cambodia. The food and non-alcoholic beverages price index in Phnom Penh has continued to increase since March 2009. For this reason, this study attempts to investigate the causes of rising food prices, assess the impact of the recent rise in commodity prices on poor households and vulnerable groups, and update the government policy responses in Cambodia. Specifically, the study will highlight the different key factors behind rising food prices in 2008 and 2011, measure the effect of the food price hikes on poverty, and provide policy options to mitigate the impact of rising food prices on poor households and vulnerable groups.
Predictable Corruption and Firm Investment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment and Survey of Cambodian Entrepreneurs
Publication Year: 2008 / Sources: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Volume 3This paper utilizes a unique dataset of 500 firms in ten Cambodian provinces and a natural experiment to test a long-held convention in political economy that the predictability of a corruption is at least as important for firm investment decisions as the amount of bribes a firm must pay, provided the bribes are not prohibitively expensive. Our results suggest that this hypothesis is correct. Firms exposed to a shock to their bribe schedules by a change in governor invest significantly less in subsequent periods, as they wait for new information about their new chief executive. Furthermore, the amount of corruption (both measured by survey data and proxied by the number of commercial sex workers) is significantly lower in provinces with new governors. Our findings are robust to a battery of firm-level controls and province-level investment climate measures.